How would you describe the political trajectory of Thailand under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra? Has her administration introduced meaningful change or do authoritarian patterns continue to dominate?

Coming to power in 2023, the current government has not changed much at all in the country, so there is little meaningful trajectory to speak of. While it did emerge from an election, which constitutes a positive step in and of itself, the previous administration had also been elected, albeit through a process heavily manipulated by the military party that took government. In that sense, the advent of a government led by a non-military party represents a small improvement in Thailand’s shaky democracy. Even so, the outcome of the election was contentious, and the coalition now in power was formed by the Pheu Thai Party in partnership with a collection of its former opponents, many of whom had previously supported or served in military-backed governments. This coalition arrangement has made it difficult for the Pheu Thai-led administration to pursue any coherent agenda. Over the past year or so, it has been hard to identify any major policy that has been implemented as proposed during the election campaign, or any meaningful reforms introduced. As Thailand now faces an array of US tariffs and navigates an increasingly volatile international environment, the government appears largely stalled and unable to chart a clear path forward.

Can you elaborate on the context in which this government came into power? What political dynamics or elite alliances shaped its formation, and how does it relate to previously military-backed administrations?

Most of the parties involved in this coalition, aside from Pheu Thai, have a history of supporting military-backed regimes, participating in coups, or being created specifically to oppose the Pheu Thai Party. That Pheu Thai now heads a government with its former foes is indeed a paradox, particularly given the intensity of past opposition to Pheu Thai and to Thaksin Shinawatra, its founder and the father of the current prime minister. His role in this story is central, not only because of his legacy, but also because of how the 2023 election outcome was negotiated.

In that election, Pheu Thai placed second in terms of both votes and seats, behind what was then the Move Forward Party. During the campaign, both Pheu Thai and Move Forward portrayed themselves as anti-military and reformist. Yet somewhere along the way, a deal was struck with what is usually referred to as Thailand’s Establishment. The precise details of this deal remain unclear, but its consequences have been far-reaching. It enabled Thaksin, who had lived in self-imposed exile for years, to return to Thailand. It also conveniently prevented the Establishment from having to contend with Move Forward, which it sure as a truly progressive party and had won more than a third of the vote and whose platform included reforms to laws linked to military governments and the monarchy, both elements of the Establishment.

The appointed Senate, carried over from the prior military administration, twice rejected Move Forward’s prime ministerial nominee. This opened the door for Pheu Thai to nominate Srettha Thavisin as prime minister and for a coalition to be formed with parties Pheu Thai had previously opposed. Many observers have described this as an unprincipled or transactional alliance, created to keep the real reformists out of power. Looking back, this government came into being through opaque negotiations and backroom arrangements. The most noticeable outcome of the deal was Thaksin’s return. Though he holds no official position, the former prime minister exercises significant influence over both the Pheu Thai Party and the coalition government.

The Thai government’s decision to deport 40 Uyghur men to China, despite international concerns, drew sharp criticism from rights organizations. What does this reveal about the role human rights norms currently play in Thai foreign policy?

International norms, in this case, appear to have held little sway. The decision to deport the Uyghurs seemed abrupt. These individuals had been detained for years, and then, quite suddenly, they were sent back to China. A similar deportation occurred in 2019 under a military-backed government, and that action, too, was met with substantial international and domestic criticism.

My sense is that the Chinese government applied renewed pressure on the Pheu Thai coalition, and it acquiesced. At the time, the Trump administration had just come into office and Marco Rubio had become Secretary of State. Thai officials may have calculated that this moment of transition in Washington would allow them to act without significant blowback. They likely believed they could gain favor with China while slipping under the radar of the new United States administration.

What they may not have anticipated is that Rubio, in contrast to the broader disorganization of the early Trump administration, had maintained a consistent stance on Uyghur rights and opposition to Chinese repression. As a result, the United States did respond, but in a limited fashion. It announced visa restrictions on unnamed Thai officials, but no identities were ever made public. Neither government clarified which Thais was targeted, which allowed the Thai government to dismiss the move as symbolic.

Throughout the process, Thailand continued to insist it had adhered to international norms, even though that claim lacks credibility. And as attention shifted to trade issues and tariffs, for a time, the deportations faded from the international radar. However, when the Trump administration imposed tariffs on Thailand, and the Thais sought negotiations, it was clear that the Uyghur issue had not been forgotten, and negotiations were postponed.

Following the deportations, the United States imposed visa sanctions on unnamed Thai officials. Do you think these measures are likely to influence Thailand’s future behavior on human rights issues, or are they, as the Thai officials claimed, largely symbolic?

Such measures were largely symbolic. Since the officials in question were never named, there was no mechanism for accountability, and the Thai government hoped to continue business as usual. At the time, the message from the United States was ambiguous. While it expressed disapproval, it stopped short of applying meaningful pressure. Without clear consequences or specific targets, the sanctions lacked the force needed to shape future policy. Along with other issues, the significance of the US position only became clearer with the postponement of tariff negotiations. 

The Trump administration’s proposed 36 percent tariff on Thai goods prompted a notable conciliatory response from Bangkok, including plans to increase imports from the United States. How do you interpret Thailand’s handling of this tension, and what does it say about its current strategy toward the United States?

Thailand, like many countries, is in a difficult position. Although Chinese investment in Thailand has increased, much of that investment involves offshoring production to circumvent U.S. tariffs. In many cases, products labeled “Made in Thailand” are actually assembled there from parts fabricated elsewhere, particularly in China. Thailand and countries like Vietnam have promised to crack down on this practice of trans-shipment in order to avoid further penalties.

The fact is that despite growing ties with China, the United States remains Thailand’s largest foreign investor in terms of total investment stock. While this may not hold true for every individual year, the long-term economic relationship is significant. And, under a previous Thaksin administration, Thailand became a major non-NATO ally of the United States.

Even so, Thailand recognizes China’s growing regional power. If U.S. attention drifts from the Asia-Pacific, countries like Thailand will likely move closer to Beijing. For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping has recently toured some Southeast Asian countries (but not Thailand), and he has framed China as a stable, rules-based trading partner. In this context, Thailand’s present strategy appears to be one of hedging, maintaining ties with both powers.

Thailand recently hosted Myanmar’s junta leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, amid ongoing military offensives and an ICC warrant. What does this suggest about Thailand’s regional diplomacy and its willingness to engage with authoritarian neighbors?

Thailand has long stood apart within ASEAN on Myanmar. Although ASEAN operates on a principle of consensus and generally avoids direct criticism of member states, most countries in the bloc have, since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, sought to distance themselves from Myanmar’s military regime. Thailand has not.

This reflects longstanding patterns and a degree of pragmatism. Thailand shares a lengthy border with Myanmar and is home to more than two million Burmese migrant workers, many of whom live and work in the country without legal status. Thai businesses also have long-standing investments in Myanmar. The Thai military has long maintained direct military connections with the Myanmar military. Under a previous Thaksin government, ties between the two countries deepened, both at the governmental and private-sector levels. 

His daughter’s government appears to walk a similar path. Paetongtarn’s government includes many figures from that earlier Thaksin era. Their thinking, shaped by that experience, has not shifted dramatically. As a result, Thailand continues to engage with Myanmar’s military regime, even as others in the region attempt to step back.

Plans to build a border wall with Cambodia have sparked debate about security, migration, and symbolism. In your view, what underlying political or strategic interests are likely driving this proposal?

The proposal to build a border wall is, in practical terms, unrealistic. The Thai–Cambodian border is long and complex, with terrain that complicates such a project. While there have been occasional clashes and long-standing disputes over various areas on the border, this proposal appears to be a symbolic response rather than a genuine security measure.

Politically, that symbolism seems designed to placate ultranationalist factions within Thailand. These groups are quick to mobilize around claims of Cambodian encroachment and such mobilizations have damaged previous administrations, especially as Thaksin is seen to be close to the regime in Phnom Penh. While international courts have weighed in on some territorial claims, the emotional resonance of these issues has not faded for ultranationalists. In this context, the wall proposal likely serves more as a statement to domestic audiences than as a realistic initiative.

Thailand has long relied on migrant labor while simultaneously expanding its detention and deportation policies. How do these developments reflect the broader dynamics of its political economy and governance?

This policy tensions on migration illustrate a deeper contradiction within the Thai political economy. Migrant labor remains indispensable, particularly in sectors like construction, agriculture, and services. At the same time, the government has expanded policies aimed at controlling, detaining, and deporting migrants. These efforts are often justified in terms of law enforcement or national security, but they also appease ultranationalists.

The result is a governance strategy marked by ambivalence. Migrants are needed, yet treated as expendable. Legal enforcement is applied unevenly, reflecting both economic imperatives and political expediency. This ambivalence reveals much about how the Thai state manages competing domestic interests while being seen to maintain order and sovereignty.

Thailand recently arrested American academic Paul Chambers under its lèse-majesté law. What are your thoughts on the use of this law, particularly in this case?

Article 112, known as the lèse-majesté law, originates from the early 20th century but in recent years has undergone a significant transformation in how it is applied. For decades, it was rarely used. That changed after the 2006 and especially following the 2014 coups, when the law became a key tool for silencing dissent and maintaining elite control.

The law has targeted a wide range of individuals, including Thaksin himself, who at one point faced more charges under Article 112 than anyone else. Though many of those cases appear to have been dropped, at least one remains, which some interpret as a way for the Establishment to keep him under control.

The use of Article 112 has grown particularly aggressive since 2020, when student-led protest movements began calling not only for constitutional reform but also for changes to the monarchy. In response, the government employed Article 112 to charge and imprison dozens of activists. Today, at least thirty people are either serving sentences or awaiting trial under the law.

Paul Chambers’ case stands out because of his profile. He is a respected academic, well known in both Thai and international circles, with a long history of publishing on the Thai military. The complaint against him was brought by the army and its related Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), and many believe it is the military’s retaliation against an academic who has been critical of its political interventions. There is no evidence that Chambers ever wrote critically about the monarchy, making the charges appear particularly thin.

His initial denial of bail surprised many observers, including some of the more conservative voices in the Thai press. Yet despite a flimsy case, the risks are real. The law allows for up to fifteen years in prison per charge, and previous cases with similarly weak evidence have nonetheless resulted in severe sentences.

Interestingly, it is now known that the abovementioned postponement of tariff negotiations between the US and Thailand included Chambers’ case, with the US expressing alarm and concern.

How do you see these recent developments—deportations, border policies, high-profile arrests—playing out in the near future? What should observers keep an eye on?

There is little reason to expect significant movement on Article 112. While the Chambers’ case may turn out to be an exception, longer-term efforts to reform the law have been thwarted. Already there has been the dissolution of the Move Forward Party and the political disqualification of several of its leaders over Article 112. Astoundingly, the Constitutional Courts decided that it is off-limits to call for reform, even limiting parliament’s capacity to debate the law. That creates a chilling effect across the political spectrum.

Broader foreign policy developments will likely be shaped by the shifting relationship between the United States and China. Thai officials, like many of their counterparts in Southeast Asia, are navigating a period of extraordinary uncertainty. New U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are reshaping regional trade patterns and poses serious economic and welfare risks. Thailand is exposed on both ends of the tariff and trade equation. There are worries about losing the US market and about being inundated with cheap Chinese exports.

Meanwhile, the longstanding diplomatic relationship between Thailand and the United States no longer offers the buffer it once did. The connections that used to exist between Thai diplomats and U.S. officials have frayed. Many of the individuals now shaping U.S. policy lack personal ties to Thailand, and vice versa. This leaves the Thai government in a vulnerable position, reliant on a past that may no longer carry the same influence. It also needs to find ways to rebuild influence in Washington.

That task will not be easy. Without the benefit of institutional memory or longstanding personal relationships, Thai policymakers may find themselves adrift in a landscape that no longer responds to the assumptions of earlier decades. As the balance of power continues to shift, Thailand’s hedging strategy will be tested in ways it has not been before.