Following the most recent Congressional session, To Lam was unanimously reappointed General Secretary of the Communist Party. Does this bode well for a reform agenda in Vietnam or rather an indication of the Party’s consolidation of power?

If we review recent political events in Vietnam from To Lam’s perspective, it appears he has achieved his great ambition of climbing the political ladder. He was junior to many other leaders but in just two years has been able to outsmart them and rise to the highest position. On his path to the top, perhaps to gain popular support, he talked a great deal about reform. But it is difficult to know for sure if that was merely a political tactic or a genuine intent to spark change.

To his credit, he did launch a swift and radical restructuring of Vietnam's fragmented administrative hierarchy last year, abolishing several central ministries and all district-level administrations. At the same time, the number of provincial administrations was reduced by half, as Vietnam's 63 provinces were ordered to merge to create new 34 provinces. This was a significant change although it is still too early to tell whether this bold administrative initiative will lead to a more effective state.

On economic and foreign policies, it is much less clear if To Lam is bringing about real change, which demands much more than administrative orders. On personnel, To Lam has placed many men from his home province of Hung Yen or from the Ministry of Public Security into various important positions, suggesting that he has succeeded in consolidating his personal power over the Communist Party. Unfortunately, this development also signals the further decay of the Party that has morphed into a web of patronage ties and personal factions in recent decades.

To Lam has made grand promises of 10% annual economic growth rates, claiming Vietnam will become a high-middle income country by 2030. What economic changes are required to pursue a high growth agenda?

Vietnam's economy is heavily dependent on exports produced by low-skill labor. So far this formula has been sufficient to raise national income, but has resulted in Vietnam being trapped at the bottom of the global supply chain. The main, long-term challenge To Lam currently faces in developing Vietnam’s economy is to build domestic manufacturing capacity for strategic industries. A second, more imminent challenge is the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, making Vietnamese goods less competitive in the US market. Perhaps up to half of Vietnamese exports have been goods made in China or South Korea and assembled in Vietnam for exporting to the US under low tariffs. In light of significantly higher American tariffs on such "transshipments," it might not be profitable for Chinese and Korean companies to remain in Vietnam for long.

Past Vietnamese leaders, not just To Lam, have struggled with the failure of industrial development. Solutions will require a true vision of development and effective policies to upgrade domestic industries. Not only that, but substantial resources must be invested to develop strategic industries and locally sourced skilled workers. As much as To Lam claims otherwise, the Vietnamese political system has yet to produce a leader with the vision and skills to make this change happen. Despite his big talk, To Lam is not surrounded by many capable officials who can help him. It is possible that change will start in the first few years of To Lam’s tenure, but it seems unlikely at this point that he will rise to the challenge.

The National Assembly recently formalized To Lam's position as the new President. What are the political and practical implications of him holding these dual roles?

One individual holding two top positions—General Secretary and State President—is a new development in the Vietnamese political system but not in neighboring China. It seems the Vietnamese have tried to copy China because they believe it is more efficient. Additionally, this move helps enhance the official and international standing of the Communist Party, whose leader can now act like a formal head of state, receiving other heads of state at home and being received by them in his visits abroad. In most non-communist countries and also most surviving communist countries today, the head of the ruling party also doubles as the head of state. This move follows this norm and helps Vietnam to conduct diplomacy more effectively.

To Lam is known for his anti-corruption stance. How has his continuation of the “Blazing Furnace” campaign reshaped politics and bureaucracy in Vietnam, and how has it altered public trust both in him as a figurehead but also in the Communist Party as a whole?

To Lam used the anti-corruption campaign to remove political rivals and rise to the top. In his previous role as Minister of Public Security, he controlled the police and had the power to investigate any other officials if he wanted. Strategically, he targeted his rivals and took them down one by one on allegations of corruption.

On its face, this campaign met the public’s demand for corrupt officials to be prosecuted for their crimes. But corruption is endemic in Vietnam. Few Vietnamese officials are clean given that they have so much power and privileges, and no opposition parties, independent courts, or private media exist to keep a check on them. Therefore, the anti-corruption campaign has merely been a way for rival factions to fight each other, while garnering public support for one's side.

Now that his power is secured, To Lam rarely talks about anti-corruption. From his perspective, the campaign has achieved its purpose, and if he were to continue encouraging the prosecution of corruption, members of his own faction could be the next victims. At the same time, it is highly likely that corruption will increase. This is because the police, which are perhaps the most corrupt institution in Vietnam, are now also the most powerful.

To Lam just returned from his first official trip as State President to China, where he met with Xi and other Chinese officials. This trip came just a few months after To Lam’s first meeting with Trump in the United States, where he participated in the first meeting of the Board of Peace. What are To Lam’s greatest challenges as he attempts to walk the diplomatic tightrope between the US and China?

Vietnamese leaders have been trying to walk this tightrope for a long time. On the one hand, they want to maintain a close relationship with China because it is considered a strategic and ideological ally. On the other hand, Vietnam needs access to Western markets. Over the last 10 years, this balancing act has grown more difficult as relations between the US and China have grown more tense. The art of avoiding taking sides calls for doing things under the table, without the US or China noticing. But the issues that spark disagreement and tension between the US and China are taking on a more public character, like the conflicts in Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela. This makes it significantly harder for Vietnam to hedge. Tariffs are not the only issue Vietnamese leaders like To Lam face. However, he is a more practical leader than his predecessors. He may rely on material incentives to keep both Washington and Beijing happy, as he tries to accommodate US and Chinese demands. In the future, however, these incentives will not be enough and he will be in a more difficult position.

In terms of balancing trade relations with China and the US, how should we interpret the manufacturing boom in alternative energies in Vietnam, especially in solar. Is this a meaningful development in terms of domestic industry or is Vietnam largely remaining a low-value assembly hub for Chinese components? By extension, as the US cracks down on Chinese transshipment and raises tariffs on Vietnam, how does this affect Vietnam?

If Vietnam could build on the current boom and come to possess its own technologies and industries of alternative energies, that would be a welcome development. Perhaps Vietnam has some leverage to demand Chinese and other foreign firms to transfer technologies rather than simply taking advantage of low-cost Vietnamese workers and other conditions, such as a large and growing local market and a favorable climate. The question is whether Vietnamese leaders have a long-term vision and ability to craft effective policies to support their industries. During the last decade domestic special interests have come to dominate Vietnam's policy-making process, leading to government decisions that supported loss-making state-owned enterprises and crony conglomerates. As a result, massive amounts of state resources were siphoned off by state managers and crony tycoons to finance their risky investment in real estate, yielding very little benefit to the country in the long term.