A key theme in your work is the distinction between American hegemony and the liberal international order more generally. You have argued that while the former may be in decline, the latter is likely to persist. For those who see these two as inextricably linked, how do you practically decouple these two concepts? 

I make a distinction, as does the world at various moments, between American power and the world it has tried to create and lead. There is the hegemonic, US-centered, Western liberal world, and then there is the wider, rules-based international order that may be tied as much to the United Nations as it is to the United States. Analytically, those two worlds are different. One could imagine a liberal international order without an American hegemon. Indeed, we may eventually find ourselves asking if a new set of countries, or a new great power, can step in to provide the kind of leadership the US has provided over the last 80 years, by supporting an open, loosely rules-based, and progressively oriented international order.

There are different ways that support for a liberal order could occur. However, it is true that when the liberal order has performed at its highest level since World War II, it has featured a powerful state that sees its interests tied to providing public goods, underwriting rules and institutions, and building bargains with other powers to create a web of global obligations. While the distinction between hegemony and the liberal order is an important one, in the real world, the presence of a powerful state that sees its long-term interests tied to this open system remains the ideal situation for that order to succeed.

In your 2018 essay “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive,” you described the international order as an aggregation of institutions rather than a single formation imposed by the US. In the second Trump Administration, we are seeing a more aggressive shift in norms and actions compared to his first administration when you wrote this essay. Do you see a structural collapse of global rules and a liberal order now as more likely?

A collapse is more likely, and the current administration is more actively and self-consciously attempting to undermine that order. It has made clear that the order the US led for 80 years is no longer seen as being in the American interest. Secretary of State Rubio said as much during his nomination hearings in January 2025, stating explicitly that the old international order no longer serves the United States because it is being used by others to undermine and attack us. This suggests a self-conscious sense that this administration is not just stepping back from leadership, but is actively trying to dismantle the system.

If President Trump makes good on his threats, can global institutions survive the full withdrawal of the United States? For example, can NATO survive without the US?

I think the answer is yes. These institutions are very hard to kill. NATO, for example, requires an act of Congress for the US to formally withdraw. President Trump can hollow it out or make it a less functional institution, but unless Congress says otherwise, NATO will survive the remaining 33 months of this administration.

Other institutions will definitely survive without the United States, though they will take on a new shape. Some will be more influenced by China, while others will be smaller or have less funding. Organizations like the WHO and various trade institutions are not going to disappear. They will remain there to be repopulated or recaptured by a future administration.

Furthermore, middle powers, such as Canada, Australia, Western European countries, Japan, and South Korea, are stepping up. These countries want the US as a partner, but they also have an independent interest in these institutions' survival. They can play a role with or without the United States, holding the hope that if these institutions remain functional, a future US administration might eventually rejoin them.

You noted the “Beijing Consensus” requires an open, liberal world to function. Specifically, China has needed access to our markets to grow. However, US openness to Chinese goods is waning. Will persistent protectionism in the US damage the incentive structure for China to support an open trading order more generally?

Since I first wrote about this, it has become clearer that China remains committed to the global multilateral trading system. China wants it to continue because it has an interest in it, even if that interest is opportunistic and not based on an embrace of liberal democracy.

The problem Trump poses to them is one that will persist even after he leaves office. China has been exporting far more to the international system than it has been importing. It is not taking steps to expand its domestic market, meaning Chinese growth is reliant on trade expansion. There is an extraordinary imbalance, with trade surpluses reaching $1.2 trillion, that creates pressures which will not disappear.

Reorganizing the trade regime is going to require significant economic diplomacy between the United States, China, and trilateral partners in Western Europe and East Asia. To ensure all parties are willing to operate in a loosely open system with shared norms, we don’t need national-level protectionism. Instead, we need cooperation between states to build a more managed order where trade flows can be reconciled with these existing imbalances.

You argue that the liberal international order is durable and it is independent from the US. Can the US return, repair or contribute to the liberal international order in a post-Trump context, or is distrust now too great?

That question will be put to the test. After this term ends in 33 months, there will be a window of opportunity for the next American president to make the case that the US wants to return as a partner within a cooperative system.

However, there will be significant suspicion and mistrust. The international community now knows that a president like Trump can return, as he did a second time. This uncertainty, that the US. might return to a unilateral, "America First" foreign policy, will be an ongoing worry that could prevent the trust needed to build long-term institutions.

To re-establish credibility, Congress will have to make changes to reduce a president's ability to govern solely through executive orders. This has become an "executive order presidency," where the president can damage the international order without congressional oversight. Congress must re-establish its role regarding tariffs and security. The next president will then need to put together an agenda to secure "trade-security bargains" with like-minded democracies, ensuring open trade among allies while collectively regulating trade with China.

Relatedly, is domestic polarization in the US a permanent barrier to long-term multilateral cooperation?

Yes, there is strong social science evidence that polarized societies have a harder time making international commitments. A competitive party system is fine, but it becomes a problem when one of the two parties operates outside the traditional parameters of the US as a global power.

A Democrat may come into office after Trump and try to return to an older form of American leadership, but they may only be in office for four or eight years before the "America First" party returns. Until the Republican Party evolves back into a more traditional conservative party, it will be difficult to maintain a consensus center that can override the extremes tearing American policy apart.

Finally, you previously suggested that rising powers like India, Brazil, and Turkey would be unlikely to swap American leadership for a “Beijing Consensus.” Do you still see limits on China’s ability to provide a legitimate alternative to the Western order?

I do see limits on what China can do. One might argue that China is advantaged by current US foreign policy, as chaos in Washington makes China look like a more steady power. To some extent, that is true; the more the US destabilizes its long-term alliances, the more countries will look toward Beijing.

However, there are limits to how far countries like Germany, France, Japan, or South Korea will tilt toward China. While many Global South countries are already tightly connected to China, there is another group, including the trilateral countries, India, and Brazil, that may seek a "third way" between Trump and Xi Jinping. These are functioning democracies that want to uphold a multilateral order without having to choose between Washington and Beijing.

Under Xi, China has decided to privilege regime security and the future of the CCP, turning into a more centralized, dictatorial regime. This comes at the expense of what is required for international leadership: rule of law, an independent civil society, and an independent judiciary. Because of the nature of the Chinese regime, there are limits to how far the rest of the world will want to migrate from Washington to Beijing.