During your time working in Pakistan, how did U.S. officials manage counterterrorism objectives while navigating broader regional dynamics involving India and China? In what ways has the U.S. changed its approach over time?

When I was stationed in Pakistan in 2010 and 2011, the U.S. was fully engaged in the war in Afghanistan, and that moment coincided with some of the most complex and sensitive phases of our regional involvement, including the operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. During that time, counterterrorism objectives took precedence above all else. Our primary operational requirement was logistical access, specifically the land corridor from the port of Karachi into Afghanistan, and the air corridor that allowed supplies and personnel to move through Pakistani airspace to Bagram Air Base. That access was non-negotiable if we were to sustain combat operations.

Diplomatically, the relationship had to be managed in a way that addressed mutual priorities. Pakistan needed support from the United States for its own internal security concerns, particularly in its northwest tribal territories and in Balochistan, where groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan were active. Intelligence sharing was critical in helping the Pakistanis map and disrupt these networks. At the same time, the relationship had to accommodate the significant political cost that Pakistan incurred for supporting U.S. operations. The Afghan War was deeply unpopular among large segments of the Pakistani public, and the government had to navigate those sensitivities.

In response, we deployed a full-spectrum approach to engagement. Our defense cooperation was robust, including a large Defense Attaché Office. Diplomatically, we maintained constant engagement at senior levels and made a concerted effort to foster economic ties, including pushing American businesses to expand trade with Pakistan. From a development standpoint, the United States Agency for International Development operated a billion-dollar annual program, which reflected the scale and ambition of our commitment.

Managing regional dynamics, particularly the India–Pakistan relationship, required careful diplomacy. The mistrust between those two countries was longstanding and deeply entrenched. As U.S. diplomats, we traveled from Islamabad to New Delhi with some frequency to speak with Indian counterparts, ensuring that they understood our presence in Pakistan was focused on counterterrorism and stability. While India did not object to those goals in principle, there was always concern about any shift in the regional balance.

China presented another layer of complexity. Even before the official launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, China was making strategic inroads in Pakistan through debt-financed infrastructure projects. Highways, ports, and energy facilities were being built under terms that offered immediate appeal to the Pakistani government. While the United States could not compete directly in terms of sheer financial outlay, we positioned ourselves differently by emphasizing governance, transparency, and institutional development. We were not offering stadiums or highways, but rather long-term partnerships based on shared principles and sustainable development models.

Since the end of the war in Afghanistan, the number of U.S. officials in Pakistan has declined. The embassy in Islamabad was one of the largest in the world at the height of the Afghan conflict. As the war wound down, the size and scope of our engagement decreased accordingly. Our relationship with Pakistan continues across the defense, development, and diplomatic spectrum, but it is now more narrowly focused. Meanwhile, China has intensified its engagement, particularly through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which has further complicated the strategic environment.

What did early U.S. responses to China’s infrastructure investments in Pakistan reveal about the broader challenge of competing with Beijing in strategically important but institutionally fragile states?

Competing with China in the domain of development assistance is inherently difficult because of the contrasting models we bring to the table. China typically arrives with offers of large-scale infrastructure projects, often with few or no governance conditions attached. They ask countries whether they would like a stadium, a port, or a major highway, and then they finance those projects on seemingly generous terms. That approach is straightforward and often appealing to governments looking for fast, visible results.

The U.S. model is fundamentally different. Our development assistance has traditionally tended to include conditions related to human rights, labor standards, and environmental protections. While this makes our aid more complex to administer, it reflects a long-term investment in institutional resilience. We emphasize transparency and sustainable governance. Although this approach can be less immediately attractive, especially to governments under short-term political pressure, it offers a more stable and equitable foundation for development partnerships.

In places like Pakistan, this distinction played out visibly. We could not match China's volume of infrastructure spending, but we remained relevant by offering solutions that addressed deeper structural needs, particularly around education, public sector reform, and civil society support.

Given the scale and complexity of U.S. counter-narcotics programs in Colombia, what lessons apply to other regions where trafficking, corruption, and armed actors similarly overlap?

The U.S. engagement in Colombia has spanned several decades and represents one of the most extensive and sustained counter-narcotics efforts globally. The overarching lesson is that successful interventions must be led by the host country and supported by broad consensus across society. In the early 2000s, Colombia was at risk of becoming a failed state. Drug trafficking had infiltrated political, economic, and social systems, and violence was widespread. President Álvaro Uribe managed to unify public opinion, which enabled the government to pass serious fiscal reforms, expand the security sector, and rebuild institutional capacity.

At that time, the U.S. provided training, intelligence, and logistical support. We shared information on maritime drug routes, assisted with the dismantling of trafficking networks, and partnered on eradication efforts. The coordination was deep, and the results were significant. However, that level of impact was only possible because the Colombian public believed the crisis was urgent and supported aggressive action.

Where has the U.S. succeeded in counter-narcotics operations, and what has accounted for that success?

Success in counter-narcotics requires a multi-pronged strategy that targets the entire supply chain. This includes shutting down processing labs, eradicating coca crops, intercepting drug shipments, disrupting financial networks, and prosecuting the criminal organizations behind the trade. In Colombia, this comprehensive strategy worked for a time because it had both government backing and societal support.

By the 2020s, that consensus had weakened. After the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), many Colombians felt that the problem had been solved. But FARC was only one actor among many. When new groups filled the vacuum, the urgency to act had faded, and eradication efforts lost momentum. Public perception shifted, viewing coca farmers as impoverished individuals rather than participants in a criminal enterprise. This made eradication politically unpopular, and the government struggled to maintain control over production levels. When production is not reduced at the source, interdiction alone becomes insufficient.

How should policymakers navigate the legal and diplomatic tensions that come with extradition-based cooperation, especially in regions where domestic legitimacy is contested?

Despite public perception, extradition is not as fraught as it is often portrayed. Most countries appreciate the opportunity to extradite individuals who are difficult to prosecute or detain domestically. Ninety-nine percent of extradition cases involve individuals who are already seen as problems by their own governments. When these individuals are removed, it relieves pressure on domestic institutions and transfers the legal and financial burden to the U.S.

Challenges arise when the person targeted is politically influential. In those cases, extradition becomes more sensitive and requires careful diplomatic handling. For example, Mexico initially resisted extraditing Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, citing the importance of prosecuting him under Mexican law. However, after two escapes from prison, the government agreed to extradite him to the U.S., where he now resides in a maximum-security facility.

To manage these situations, the U.S. takes several precautions. In cases where the crime in question is eligible for capital punishment and the partner country prohibits it, we provide written assurances that the death penalty will not be pursued. We avoid excessive publicity unless the host country wants to make the extradition public. We also use extradition as a channel for broader institutional cooperation, offering legal training and investigative support that strengthens local law enforcement.

The most politically sensitive cases are those involving senior figures with constituencies or power bases. One such example is the 2020 arrest of Mexican General Salvador Cienfuegos. Although he was not extradited, his detention in the U.S. caused a major political firestorm in Mexico because of his stature and influence. These cases require coordination at every level of government, with a focus on minimizing public confrontation and preserving the broader bilateral relationship.

What global trends or U.S.-led efforts are most likely to influence the international balance of power in the coming years?

In the context of Asia, one of the most consequential developments of the twenty-first century is the strategic competition between the United States and China. That competition extends well beyond military posture or formal diplomacy. It encompasses technology, currency systems, global trade, and the broader contest over governance models. The core issue now is who will shape the rules of the road for the next stage of the global order.

This is not confined to traditional geopolitical dynamics. It involves how the United States and China compete in fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor supply chains, and financial architecture. One facet of that competition lies in how the U.S. dollar withstands efforts by China to internationalize the yuan. Another dimension is the evolving relationship between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Whether that alignment solidifies into a structured bloc or remains a loosely coordinated grouping remains uncertain.

Equally critical is how the United States maintains its alliance architecture. Preserving and strengthening relationships across the western Pacific, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean will be essential. The evolution of these alliances, the scale and nature of U.S. investment in them, and the strategic messaging surrounding its vision for the region will all play significant roles. These forces are among those that will ultimately shape the trajectory of international relations in the years to come.