In October 2024 the 16th annual BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia. Major topics included the instatement of BRICS Pay, the introduction of new members, and efforts to strengthen the New Development Bank. Can you talk about the conference's most important agenda items or outcomes?

People tend to over-dramatize the BRICS group. We should not idolize BRICS, but we also should not demonize it either. One of the most important aspects of the meeting was the conversations on the sidelines. Given the hegemony and recent weaponization of the US dollar and the euro, the payment system was important. In terms of Russia’s agenda for hosting the meeting, they hoped to demonstrate that they were not isolated. They were successful in this, given that others attended the conference in Kazan, Russia. 

As for the New Development Bank, it is still not a very big player in the economic development scene. This is because it has not made many loans, and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been more successful. AIIB is older, relatively speaking, and has a greater potential to help with development. It will probably be more valuable for aspiring developing countries than anything the New Development Bank can realistically do immediately. 

President Putin hopes to advance an agenda of weakening the global role of the U.S. dollar and move ahead with plans for a BRICS Bridge. Why are these priorities for Russia?

This is a relatively recent priority for Russia, as the sanctions intensified. Sanctions have existed since 2014, but after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia became the most sanctioned country in history.  What has been most scary for Russians has been the seizure of Russian assets equivalent to 300 billion US dollars and the appropriation of interest. The legalities of this are not fully worked out, but earlier types of seizure, like in the case of Iran or Venezuela, did not affect Russia. Only once this seizure came home did Russia become very concerned and make more of an effort to reduce its dependence on the dollar.

It is still unclear if the BRICS can weaken the dollar. Realistically, the dollar will likely be used a lot less than it is used now, although that is a separate discussion from this one. Right now, it is most immediately a question of political survival for Russia, as they want to make sure their economy is functioning and reliable. Russia does have a settlement system of its own, but that doesn't work for the Western countries trying to sanction Russian trade. Russia has begun directing trade more toward the Global South and Eurasia. For example, trade with India has increased a great deal. In that sense, BRICS connections are very important for Russia's economy and the government’s political survival.

This new summit formally welcomed the new BRICS members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Notably, thirty countries also reportedly expressed interest in future membership. How important are these new actors individually and collectively?

Individually, some actors are more important than others, particularly oil and gas-rich countries. The United Arab Emirates is quite wealthy and has oil, so it is an important player along with Iran. Egypt and Ethiopia are less important. 

There have been some tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia in recent years. In addition, Iran and Saudi Arabia have also had conflicts. Given this, there is no sense that we can call these countries “collective actors”; they are only united in managing their relationships with the G7 powers by acting collectively at times.

Of the thirty countries that have expressed interest, thirteen have become partners. The four Asian countries - Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia - are quite important. Indonesia is especially important as an emerging regional power in Asia, similar to India. In the Western Hemisphere, Bolivia and Cuba have joined, although they are not as important, since U.S. hegemony in the area remains mostly intact. This hegemony lacks the moral and intellectual dimension of domination that it had at the end of WWII, but it remains powerful. Hence, I do not see Bolivia, Cuba, or even Brazil challenging it. There are tensions among these countries as collective actors too, as Brazil opposed the inclusion of Venezuela in BRICS.  Geography plays a role in the importance of these powers. South America, Central America, and the Caribbean are much closer geographically to the US, which is unchangeable. Asia is much closer to China, India, and Russia. Africa is in the middle but has more of an aversion to European powers given the colonial history there. As African countries move away from neo-colonialism, they will likely get support from other BRICS countries like South Africa. For African states, then, working with BRICS is likely positive.

Will diversified membership complicate efforts to reach unified policy positions or will it increase the power of BRICS in international politics?

It is always complicated to reach any kind of common position, especially when many of these countries already have tensions among them. The collective action problem will be hard to overcome, except in cases where their common interest is threatened by G7 countries. This can happen in trade, finance, and direct military intervention. For example, France frequently has military interference in Africa, which Africans are not happy about. Asia is calmer; the main competition is between the U.S. and China, which is a dangerous rivalry. In general, BRICS countries are looking to avoid catastrophic military conflict between these two nations. They also do not want the conflict in Ukraine to continue, but they are unable to control that. BRICS will not act as a unified actor in many things except in defending common economic interests and trying to avoid catastrophic wars. 

Some characterize the BRICS group as an amorphous club that aims to bypass Western states and institutions. How “anti-western” is the BRICS group? Does its expansion and growing presence change its agenda or how it will act in the near future? 

BRICS is not “anti-West” but rather “anti-hegemonic,” and there’s a difference. The BRICS is interested in trading with the West. For instance, Russia was trading more with Europe, and to some extent the U.S., more than Asian countries like India or African and Latin American countries before sanctions were put in place. Likely, they would still be interested in having trade relationships after this conflict is over. In addition, Russians are, in some broad sense, Europeans. Historically though, there is a conflict of Eurasianism in Russia between these identities. China is also an important trade nation, although if it were ever sanctioned the way Russia has been, it may be forced to look for partners elsewhere. China has many important trading partners which it would like to maintain. Countries in Latin America along with India also are focused on their trading partners. These actors must manage trade relationships, but in general, they want to diversify their trade partners. Importantly, they wish to maintain their sovereignty.  

Will the expansion and growing membership of BRICS change the way the group will go about these objectives, or will it remain similar to the way it has been?

BRICS countries, especially the big ones, will be pursuing their national interests. What these interests exactly are changes over time. A British politician once said, “There are no permanent allies, there are no permanent friends, there are only permanent interests”. Many of these nations want peace and are interested in building institutions that will ensure it for everyone, not just for a narrow band of elites. 

The problem in every country, including the U.S. and other G7 countries, is internal. There are examples of polarization and divisions between elite and ordinary people. These problems are of concern to all countries, and BRICS nations and their partners must pay attention to these problems as they work to avoid war and build institutions that will lead to mutual prosperity. 

After the recent U.S. election, many are wondering what a Trump presidency will mean for U.S. foreign policy. Does Trump’s reelection matter for the BRICS as a group? What are the implications for future summits or membership prospects? 

Trump already served four years, so many of his policies are probably going to be extensions of that. Moreover, recall that the Biden administration did not lift the tariffs that the Trump administration imposed on China. The China-U.S. relationship will be particularly fraught and must be approached carefully. 

One true thing, is that Trump did not get us involved in any new war. Many are predicting then that he will not get us involved in a major military confrontation during his second term. However, Trump is unpredictable, so you have to be cautious with predictions. Trump will want other countries, even European ones, to rely less on the U.S. In some cases, this is justified to meet the American people’s needs. He will put tariffs on other countries and most nations are bracing for that aspect of his agenda. 

Historically, the U.S. system has prioritized strategic industries. The U.S. developed a national economy by connecting physically different parts of the country through canals, then railroads, and then a central bank. We cannot go back and build the U.S. industry behind a tariff wall, but there is a lot the U.S. can do to create new jobs and distribute wealth. BRICS countries also have these internal problems and are aware of them to varying extents. The Trump Administration is going to have to look into these problems more deeply and not just look back to the pre-WWII U.S. system without considering the historical context of how it was developed. 

Will the role of BRICS countries as a collective change as Trump comes into office? 

BRICS will remain a loose group of individual countries, however, the relations between these individual countries and the U.S. will certainly shift. Trump wants to break apart the close economic and political relationship between China and Russia. He will likely not succeed at this as Russia perceives that it has been double-crossed by Europe and by the U.S. There is little trust. However, Russian leaders do realize we all must coexist, and they are equally uninterested in nuclear war. Hopefully, this common ground prevails alongside the current tensions. I do not see a significant lessening of tensions or the toning down of rhetoric, but realistic attempts can be made to avoid a kind of rivalry that would lead to further war. No country wants “forever wars” because they are a drain on resources and nations have other needs. There are foolish leaders all over the world, many in power right now, so I hope wiser leadership collectively develops. Everyone has some responsibility in this, even intellectuals like me.