You currently serve as a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress after stepping down as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs last spring. Can you talk briefly about what led to your resignation?  You were an early critic of the Biden administration’s initial “bear hug” approach to the war. Did these criticisms play a role in your decision to step away from the position? 

My decision to step down was almost exclusively motivated by family considerations. These jobs are always intense, even under normal circumstances, and the last eight months of my tenure in the position, which coincided with the war, were anything but conventional.

That was ultimately the reason that I left. Although I certainly disagreed with some of the policy decisions that were made, I made those views known within the interagency. I wasn't necessarily a critic of the embrace; I was more a critic of how the administration used the embrace. It could have been leveraged to secure changes in Israeli behavior with respect to the conduct of the war in Gaza and the provision of humanitarian assistance much earlier. It wasn’t necessarily a mistake to embrace the Israeli government at the outset, but it wasn't fully used to its potential in pursuing U.S. objectives.

As the previous Director for Egypt and Israel Military Issues during the Obama administration, you were involved in deliberations on U.S. security assistance to Egypt and Israel and peace within the Middle East. Given your background in this role, did the onset and scale of the war in Gaza surprise you? Could Hamas’ attack, Israel's full-scale response, and broader escalation within the Middle East have been predicted?

What surprised us was that the conflict started in Gaza. Some individuals in the Administration anticipated that there could be some type of conflagration between Israel and the Palestinians for some time, but we were focused primarily on Jerusalem and the West Bank as the theaters where this would occur. In comparison, it appeared that Gaza was a bit calmer in certain respects, although that was proven dramatically and tragically wrong on October 7.

What created the climate for the October 7 attack was a lot of the same things that we were concerned about in Jerusalem and the West Bank. This included the conditions of Palestinians, the policies of the Israeli government, the strengthening of extremists within the Palestinian political system, and support from external actors to terrorist organizations. We saw all of that and feared that it would lead to an explosion.

Once the conflict happened, we immediately recognized the potential that it could spread elsewhere. No matter where the conflict occurred, we had assumed there was an inevitable risk of it going outside of the borders and spreading to other parts of the region. To the administration's credit, the U.S.'s early policy focus was to prevent the spread of the conflict. While the conflict has spread to Lebanon and elsewhere, in the grand scheme of things, it certainly could have been worse. It could also be a lot better, but we haven't yet seen the doomsday scenario in the region that we were most concerned about. The issue is that the longer the conflict continues, the higher the probability we could wind up in one of those even more disastrous outcomes, no matter how well we handle diplomacy.

Since your resignation, this conflict has only escalated. Many are concerned about the War in Gaza not only because of the rising death toll but also because of rising widespread instability within the Middle East and dangers to the global economy. Where is this escalation headed and how dangerous is it? Is a wider war likely?

I don't see an immediate off-ramp for the conflict and the daily conflicts taking place right now between Israel and Hamas and Israel and Hezbollah. I am skeptical that all of these actors are both interested in and capable of delivering some type of negotiated solution, but that may change and I certainly hope it does. There is some talk of a cease-fire in Lebanon, which would be welcome, although if it will be achieved anytime soon is unclear.

In terms of the potential for it to spread further, while still possible, it is slightly lower than we originally feared. This is partly because Iran's axis of resistance has proved less formidable than both Israel and the United States expected. Iran has demonstrated some risk aversion, for fear of inviting further attacks. There is a risk that we could over-correct and assume that there are essentially no circumstances in which Iran or Hezbollah would intensify their operations against Israel or U.S. facilities. We don't know where this line is, which adds a degree of uncertainty of if it could become a greater conflict. The single most important thing that President Biden could do before leaving office is to try to bring a resolution to the conflicts in both Lebanon and Gaza so that his successor can start a cleaner slate than would be the case otherwise.

We are just days out from finding out who this successor will be. In a Harris presidency, do you expect her to extend the Biden administration’s response to the war despite widespread criticism of this approach? In a Trump presidency, how would his response counter the Biden administration’s? How dangerous would this response be to the stability of the Middle East?

With Vice President Harris, it's somewhat difficult to discern what policy approach she will take, in part because she hasn't been able to publicly address any policy differences she may have. This is for good reason, if she articulated positions that were different from the President's, it could unintentionally undercut his policy. She has not been able to be as forthright and detailed about her policies as a presidential candidate normally would be. I do think there is a difference in her level of empathy for Palestinians, not that she doesn't have empathy for Israelis, but it is easier for her than for President Biden to identify with the Palestinians because of her personal experiences and largely generational differences. President Biden is not indifferent to the welfare of Palestinian civilians, but he has a much longer relationship with the Israeli people. We haven’t seen if that empathy would translate into a different approach, it depends on her advisors and what type of policy she runs.

Former President Trump is somewhat of a wild card on this issue. On the one hand, as president, he demonstrated strong support for Israel and prioritized that relationship over any relationship with the Palestinians. I don't think that reflects his personal convictions; it was a political calculation viewed as necessary for his political base. His political calculus could change, but his advisors are likely more ideologically committed to the positions that he took in his first term. We’d probably see more of the same and he is likely to prioritize bringing the war to an end like the current administration, but there's a non-zero probability he could take a different posture vis-a-vis Prime Minister Netanyahu (who he criticized after he congratulated President Biden on his election). Many supporters of Israel are looking to him to continue the same policies from his time in office, while opponents of his policies believe he has turned a page; that is what creates a degree of uncertainty and what makes President Trump such a singular individual.

There is not necessarily consensus about which of these responses is a bigger danger to the stability of the Middle East, but there are two important variables. The first is how long the conflict takes place and the second is how it ends and what comes next. If there isn't aggressive diplomacy following the end of the war to stabilize, consolidate, and resolve the underlying conflict of the situation, there is a real risk that it could reignite. No matter who wins the election, they're going to be faced with a Gaza that has largely been decimated, and a Palestinian society that's been completely broken apart. President Trump may say, “That's not our problem, Israel, you deal with it.” A President Harris is less likely to wash her hands of what's going on in Gaza. The biggest mistake for the United States would be to pivot too quickly away from the conflict. We must focus on other national security challenges, but if we move away from the conflict too quickly, we may leave seeds of the conflict to reignite. The U.S.’s international position has suffered during this war because we supported Israel, whether that support is right or wrong. We cannot do much to change that perception or restore our international position while the conflict is ongoing, but once it ends, there is an opportunity to shift the conversation from conflict to peace and make tangible progress in calming tensions on the ground, especially with Iran’s proxies and nuclear program. This will not happen automatically, especially if the United States pivots. A President Harris is much more capable and temperamentally suited for this; I worry with President Trump that his tendency to “declare mission accomplished” and place interests in the “theater” of saying that he’s won before a conflict is resolved will be damaging. While nothing in this conflict is a “victory,” there's a difference in terms of war and peace in the future.

You have advocated that the United States should support Palestinian rights and statehood, but you have also supported Israel’s security and are deeply attached to the fight against antisemitism. Are these two ideas opposing? Is there a middle ground between these polarizing positions for you personally? What about in U.S. foreign policy more broadly? 

There has to be a middle ground, and if there isn’t, we need to create it. I don't think Jewish and Palestinian self-determination are mutually exclusive in principle. Configurations where they are exclusive are not good outcomes for Israelis, Palestinians, the U.S., or the international community. Too often, the conflict is framed in zero-sum terms by partisans who want to provide the most simplistic explanation for what's happened. But, very few things are black and white in practice. Our humanity requires that we treat human beings, regardless of race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation, as equal; that is at the heart of our experiment as a country. If we don't honor those values, domestically and internationally, it undercuts the U.S. comparative advantage in global affairs and character. There are well-meaning people on both sides and the U.S. is best when we unite rather than divide; pitting one group against another is a zero-sum game. Many feel their identity is implicated in this conflict, which makes it different from other foreign policy problems that don’t have such a domestic resonance. We don’t have to agree, but listening and understanding are part of a democracy.

Given the status of the war, do you think both short and long-term peace within Gaza is possible? Is it possible for Palestine to exist as a free state? 

It depends on how you define peace. If you define it in terms of the absence of conflict, then that is possible in the short term, but difficult in the long term. If you define peace as an actual agreement and recognition of each other, I see very little probability of that in the short term, but it's essential in the long term even though it will be extremely difficult.

Peace will be harder now than it was before, particularly because of the consequences of what is happening in Gaza, which we cannot fully grasp right now. I still think that a two-state solution in which Israel lives side by side with the Palestinian state is possible, but the ability of parties to arrive at that agreement is arguably lower than it's ever been. What keeps the two-state solution alive is that ultimately it's going to be preferable to the alternative for both Palestinians and Israelis. Many Palestinians now support a one-state outcome with equal rights, but that position is motivated by a belief that a two-state solution is no longer possible. They see the Israeli government seeking control over the entire territory in an arrangement whereby Palestinians do not exercise equal rights, but I don’t think that is actually the alternative. The alternative is a civil war or protracted conflict. There is still hope for a two-state solution and it is better than alternatives, but the US and others might have to play a role. I'm skeptical that a single-state outcome, even if in theory, everyone has equal rights, is going to be successful. I would like to be wrong, but I still think that all else being equal, the two-state solution remains alive, even if it's hanging by a thread, and is best for Israelis, Palestinians, people in the region, and the United States.

As we sit on a college campus discussing the war in Gaza, it is notable that college campuses have been both battlegrounds of protests in support of Palestine and the subject of widespread media criticism and pushback within the last year. How do you make sense of the role of protest on college campuses around the country? Do you think that productive and positive change can arise from these spaces and what role do we as students have in this?

Protesting, in and of itself, is a healthy, normal part of any democracy. There's a long tradition of student protests on domestic and international issues in the United States. The risk is that these protests, at times, generate acts of hatred, racism, antisemitism, and Islamophobia that cause people to feel unsafe. The challenge is forging consensus, or at least finding a way to address these issues in a way that does not, whether unintentional or not, alienate those who are opposed to you. This happens on both sides. When pro-Israel protesters suggest that “all Palestinians are terrorists” or when pro-Palestinian protestors say, “all Jews are responsible for what Israel is doing,” it turns off some of the people that need to be persuaded. Controlling the rhetoric is hard because, by nature, protest movements are somewhat chaotic, decentralized, and often lack clear leadership. The most important thing is that each community or protester decides to self-police and keep the moral high ground even when others inevitably don’t. This way, individuals are not vilified and dehumanized in the protest process. Self-policing is a tall task, but it is better than a situation where a university, rightly or wrongly, decides to deploy security forces. When that happens, it is a clear sign of failure that officials must enter a space where freedom of thought, speech, learning, and activism is central. Hopefully, these deployments happen less in the coming months, but these problems that we see are not unique to Israel/Palestinian protests. The protesters can have an impact, but it is critical to determine how to translate what they're doing on campuses into the corridors of power. Yes, people read the news about protests, but protests don't automatically lead to political change. There must be a strategy to harness that energy and bring it into the formal political process, which takes time.