In your book, Exit from International Organizations, you argue that states often use exit as a costly strategy to negotiate institutional or policy change. The Sahel states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrew a couple of weeks ago from the ICC in protest of the court’s bias towards prosecuting Africans. Other African nations, such as Kenya, South Africa, The Gambia, Uganda, Namibia, and more, have either made similar threats or reversed their decisions to withdraw. What factors explain why some of these states have decided to fully withdraw, while others have not taken the complete step?

​You are right that these countries have sometimes threatened to withdraw, and sometimes they've pulled back. As mentioned, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all announced their withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) on September 22 of 2025. They cited that the ICC’s alleged neo-colonialist repression and selective justice against developing nations were reasons for withdrawing. However, their withdrawal is not effective until a year after they have submitted a formal notification, and only a month or so has elapsed. Moreover, the ICC has said that it has not received a formal withdrawal instrument. Our book shows that 80% of the time, countries that threaten to withdraw don't actually end up withdrawing. The case of the Sahel states would be considered a threat at this point, because it's still within a year-long waiting period. Our research shows that withdrawal rarely occurs, yet the rhetoric of withdrawal is highly effective for negotiation, gaining international attention, and fomenting domestic support.​

In fact, this is what happened in the other cases you mentioned. Several African countries have threatened withdrawal from the ICC, including South Africa, The Gambia, Kenya, and Burundi. Most reversed course due to domestic legal constraints, regime change, or renewed dialogue with the Court. Crucially, Kenya remains a member of the ICC, but it has shown a lot of hostility toward the court. It is really important to recognize that just because countries don't withdraw doesn't mean that they're happy. Burundi is the only one that completed its withdrawal in 2017, following ICC investigations into human rights abuses.

​A couple of patterns emerge from our research here: countries that pull back on their withdrawal threats either have a change of heart, a change of government, or some sort of traction in their talks. Those who actually withdraw are often trying to escape accountability. That doesn't always occur, such as with Duterte in the Philippines.

​While I’ve listed mainly cases in Africa related to the ICC, the strategy of withdrawing while also trying to brand the IO as being biased or neo-colonial is a strategy that others have also used. Russia used it when it was withdrawing from the Council of Europe after it got suspended. The Russians tried to reframe the narrative and make it about the IO instead of them. Blaming the IO is something that countries often do.​

The Africa bias is a common refrain that these countries use. Many of these institutions were spearheaded by Western countries. The United States, for example, had a big hand in the Rome Statute, even though it didn't end up signing it or retracted its signature. But there’s been a lot of research trying to systematically examine whether the ICC has an Africa bias, and most of the research shows no bias once you've controlled for the kind of problems that are happening and the degree to which that's happening. That is what's accounting for this. Moreover, when you survey the African people, even if leaders like to cite this bias and their disdain for these organizations, around 80% want their countries to stay in these courts or these organizations, because they feel they don't have anywhere else to turn domestically. Thus, the ICC is a type of safety net for many people.

With only 19 members, the Asia-Pacific region remains the most underrepresented region in the ICC. What explains this pattern? Are regional preferences and norms correlated with a willingness to cooperate and participate in certain international organizations?

It’s true that, as a percentage, the Asia-Pacific region does seem to be underrepresented in the ICC, but I want to caution you in a couple of different ways on how to make that calculation. First, not all states are the same in terms of size and importance. For example, big powers like India and China are not members of the ICC. This is a trend, not because of their region necessarily or their cultural preferences and norms. It’s a trend because there are big, important countries, such as Russia, the US, Israel, and more, that are also not members of the ICC. To me, that's not an Asia-Pacific phenomenon.

​The main reasons why states choose not to join the ICC are related to sovereignty. In essence, they're worried about intrusions into their domestic affairs. There is research that Asian states might prioritize their national sovereignty more compared to other countries. This was called the “ASEAN Way,” describing the notion that countries in the ASEAN area, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, etc., had different ways that they liked to cooperate. While there is some research that latches onto this argument, I have some research that rebuts that claim. It starts with the foundation that every state, not just Asia-Pacific states, cares about sovereignty. How can you make the claim that India, for example, or China, cares more about sovereignty than the United States right now?

​In separate research, my co-author and I find that some of what's been called the “ASEAN Way” is actually just showing differences in timing for when countries sign up for different international organizations. Asian countries have just been slower to join formal organizations that have a treaty, such as the ICC with the Rome Statute. However, all countries, regardless of region, are now much more likely to join informal organizations. These informal organizations include things like the G8, the G20, and the BRICS. The reason is that countries are increasingly becoming more reluctant to sign treaties and formal IOs. Overall, this has nothing to do with their region, and it is not a cultural phenomenon. Rather, as the world changes, countries are becoming more likely to protect their sovereignty in different ways.

​I want to be careful that we don't use a stand-in regional variable as a cover for what are deeper problems in international affairs. The Asia-Pacific region is also really diverse. ​

The Philippines withdrew from the ICC in 2019, which many viewed as a decision by then-President Duterte to evade accountability after the ICC announced investigations into his “war on drugs.” Since taking office, President Trump has shifted US foreign policy on international organizations, notably withdrawing from the WHO, UNESCO, and the Paris Climate Accords. How do these examples of withdrawal that are guided by individual interests interact with the general framework of your book, which argues that exit is usually a negotiation strategy aimed at institutional change?

I want to emphasize that my data span over 100 years, ending in 2022. As social scientists, we usually look at the past to understand what we think might happen in the future. However, there's a difference between historical analysis and forecasting. While I don't have a crystal ball, you're right to try to question what's happening in contemporary times. There are a few ways that what's happening right now aligns with my theoretical framework, as well as my empirics. Nonetheless, there are a couple of points that might be challenged, considering we are facing a crisis in multilateralism right now, or even a turning point. ​

While it might sound like these examples differ from the general framework of the book, they're actually good examples of a couple of the mechanisms we outline. First, one of the key things that triggers withdrawal is when a country becomes what we call a “preference outlier.” This means that they become extremely different from the average within the IO. We measure this in a bunch of different ways, but we mainly examine how they're voting in the UN. When that becomes divergent after they try to negotiate institutional change, they may not be able to get other countries to side with them. And, if they become an outlier, withdrawal is far more likely. This is what is happening with the United States right now as we drift away from many countries, such as those in Western Europe, or Canada and Australia.​

Second, something that we show historically and is also happening right now with the United States, is that declining power is a key trigger of withdrawals. When countries become less powerful, they are more likely to withdraw because their current negotiating power is higher than in the future. The United States' power is and has been declining for quite some time, with the rise of China and other countries.

​Lastly, we show that the US has been one of the most frequent withdrawers, along with Canada and the UK. The fact that we're withdrawing from some of these organizations right now actually aligns with historical patterns.

​Just because the leader wants the international organization to change doesn't mean that it will. In the case of the World Health Organization, we might see some reform, perhaps with the United States gone. But that’s likely because the World Health Organization was having a lot of challenges even before the United States left. Moreover, in the process of us leaving, a lot of damage is occurring. Normatively, even if change can occur, this is not necessarily a beneficial process to get there.​

There are many other instances when withdrawal happens to escape accountability, and this is fairly standard. There has always been an element of the United States feeling like it can do things that other countries can't in international law. The common refrain is that we want to create law for thee and not for me. That’s what the United States did by creating the Rome Statute. In some ways, what Trump is doing right now does stand apart, but some of these current themes extend historically.​

The United States has never ratified the Rome Statute, and, under the Trump administration, has taken further steps to oppose the court through sanctions against individuals. Now, the administration is considering entity sanctions on the entire court. Your book mainly discusses how members of international organizations shape and protest decisions. Considering the United States is not a member of the ICC, how can powerful non-member states shape the behavior and dynamics of international organizations?

It’s important to note how damaging this sanctioning by the US of ICC leaders can be for the legitimacy of the Court. This has been going on for some time, and it's going to be interesting to watch how the organization responds and how it survives this. Your question is not one that we directly cover in the book, but it's very much related. Your question highlights that there are a lot of in-between ways that states push their foreign policy strategies outside of formal membership.

​There are a couple of different ways that powerful non-member states try to shape the behavior of IOs. First is through observer status in the IOs. Observer status can be a formal or informal designation. It changes between IOs and between countries, but with an observer role, states can attend international organization meetings. Importantly, they're present to cajole and incentivize states. Just the sheer presence of the US can sometimes matter, but they're also present for the important conversations that happen in between all of the formal meetings. In the case of the US and the ICC, we had a working relationship with the Court during the Obama administration, where we were taking on this observer status. For instance, we attended meetings of the Assembly of State Parties in an observer category. While we absolutely have a hostile relationship now, in the past, observer status has been more positive.

​Second, states can push their foreign policy strategies through funding. This is likely where a lot of the cajoling is happening right now. Powerful states can increase or decrease their funding as a way of controlling the outcomes of IOs. They can hold back their assessed dues until they deem that the IO's actions are more acceptable. We’re in $1.5 billion of arrears to the United Nations right now. States can also channel funds to pet projects that align with their preferences. There's a lot of research right now looking at how states earmark funds. States are also setting up what are called “IO trust funds” to ensure that their money is only being spent on the things that they like, such as certain foreign aid or debt relief.

​Third, states can push their foreign policy strategies through leadership positions at IOs. This goes beyond membership. China is actually good at this. Chinese nationals hold leadership positions at a number of different UN specialized agencies, as well as the Food and Agriculture Organization, Interpol, the International Telecommunications Union, which probably doesn't sound very glitzy, but it controls everything on your phone, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and even a deputy managing director position at the IMF. With these leadership positions, they can help control the agenda of meetings, allowing them to act as gatekeepers by keeping things off the agenda. They can shape the norms of how meetings are run. Research also shows they even have an influence on how the meeting minutes are recorded, and more. Even when a country doesn't have a leadership position, countries can influence their staffing through their secondment. This is where government officials on special assignments go and work for the IOs.