Willy Lam on recent developments in Hong Kong

Riot police stand by on Hong Kong's Nathan Road during the unrest in February 2016 that was later called the "Fishball Revolution."

Willy Lam is a veteran observer and analyst of Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics and author of numerous books on China. He is an Adjunct Professor at the History Department and the Center for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He recently published Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping (Routledge, 2015, New York). He spoke to Glenys Kirana '16 on Feb. 23, 2016.

Could you describe briefly what the “Fishball Revolution” was?

The so-called Fishball Revolution started on the first day of Chinese New Year. The initial cause was a series of clashes between food hawkers and the police. The police were trying to ban these illegal street hawkers — which actually are quite common in Hong Kong — and most of these hawkers were selling hot food like fish balls and other delicacies. On the night of February 8th, an assortment of citizen groups in Hong Kong, including one or two major nativist, indigenous-oriented groups — was advocating views that championed Hong Kong’s freedom, distinctiveness, and autonomy. They supported the hawkers and tried to prevent the police from removing the hawkers. The situation escalated throughout the night until the early morning of February 9th, and at its height there were about 700 Hong Kong citizens participating in this protest. What stood out from the event was excessive police violence because the police were using pepper spray, and at one point, one police officer fired two shots into the air to warn the protesters. As a result, the protesters responded with bricks and other objects thrown at the police. Eventually about 70 people were hurt, but there were no deaths or other serious casualties. Another important element of the disturbance was the participation of “triads” (equivalent of the Mafia). There has been speculation as to who paid for these outlaws to stir up trouble in the middle of the night.

Do you think the event was politically significant and how is Beijing reacting to this incident and its aftermath?

In terms of the level of violence, this was a serious case. Even though compared to the Leftist Riots in 1967 — historically the most serious rioting which Hong Kong had experienced — the recent incident was not as violent. Even though the police fired two shots into the air, the situation was contained within five to six hours. But the major point is that the reaction from the Hong Kong administration under chief executive C.Y. Leung and from Beijing has been excessive. They have used this incident as pretext to say that there is a group of Hong Kong separatists seeking independence and creating this incident to arouse public support.

Could you also explain why the apparent “disappearance” of the five book publishers and editors has aroused so much anxiety in Hong Kong?

The “One Country, Two Systems” as well as Hong Kong's constitution, have spelled out very clearly that mainland security officers, police or security agents cannot operate in Hong Kong. And that within Hong Kong, only Hong Kong’s laws apply. However, in the case of the five members of publishing company, Mighty Current Media, one major shareholder, Mr. Lee Bo, suddenly disappeared on Dec. 30, 2015. Circumstantial evidence pointed to the fact that he was abducted by mainland security agents in broad daylight in Hong Kong and then taken back to Shenzhen. This case is very disturbing as this was the first case of a publisher or a person from the intellectual circles being abducted into China. So far, Mr. Lee Bo, who is believed to be somewhere in Guangdong province, has released several statements saying that he went back to China to settle some individual business, and asked Hong Kong people not to demonstrate on his behalf. However, most people believe that these statements were made under duress, and this was a blatant breach of the “One Country, Two Systems” model.

How well do you think Hong Kong’s leadership is handling these incidents?

At this stage it seems clear that from the point of view of C.Y. Leung, his major motive is to seek another five-year term, which will be determined in the elections next year involving just 1,200 members of the community, most of whom are handpicked by Beijing. Thus, C.Y. Leung is supporting and echoing Beijing’s conspiracy theory that these indigenous, pro-Hong Kong values groups are spreading separatist values and tendencies. In response, people in Hong Kong, particularly intellectuals, have lost trust in C.Y. Leung. C.Y. Leung himself has continued to disregard demands from intellectuals, but particularly from college and high school students, to ensure that Hong Kong’s core values, such as freedom of expression, civil liberties, and freedom of assembly would be preserved. At this stage there is a confrontation and a lack of dialogue between young people, particularly politically active college students and young professionals, and the C.Y. Leung administration.

Do you see, with these recent incidents, the end of the “One Country, Two Systems” experiment?

For the first five years after Hong Kong’s sovereignty was reverted back to China in 1997, Beijing largely respected the “One Country, Two Systems” model. Hong Kong government had a high degree of autonomy but gradually and relentlessly, Beijing started interfering Hong Kong’s legislative branch and local representative bodies. For example, in the past 10 years in Hong Kong, from the legislative council elections to the district council election (grassroots level), representatives from Beijing have been playing an increasingly significant role in helping pro-Beijing candidates win seats in such representative bodies, including the legislative council. Beijing has also been trying to influence the media in Hong Kong. Most Hong Kong newspapers and TV stations have been obliged to follow Beijing’s line, and others have seen a high degree of self-censorship. Recently, Beijing is also encouraging Chinese corporations to buy ownership of major Hong Kong media. The most recent example was the Alibaba Group buying the South China Morning Post, Hong Kong’s oldest and influential English-language paper. The upshot of all these events is that people fear that the “One Country, Two Systems” model may exist in name only but not in substance. We have seen that more and more of Hong Kong domestic affairs, including the state of the media and civil liberties, might be directly or indirectly controlled by Beijing.

Besides adopting hardline measures, how can Beijing win back the “hearts and minds” of the people in Hong Kong?

So far, the C.Y. Leung administration has followed instructions from Beijing to try to inculcate Chinese patriotic and nationalistic values amongst college students and high school students in Hong Kong. For example, the Hong Kong government is paying for expensive trips made by high school and college students to the mainland during some holidays to learn from the patriotic and nationalistic values in China. But these efforts to try to promote nationalism among Hong Kong's young people have not been successful because most young people in Hong Kong are very alarmed by what is happening in China, such as end to political reform, restitution of Maoist values, and the resuscitation of values associated with the Cultural Revolution. In fact, efforts by the C.Y. Leung administration to promote patriotism and nationalism has produced the exact opposite result, and that is actually the number one reason for the growth of this activist sentiment amongst young people. Young people here are afraid that the “One Country, Two Systems” is being undermined gradually, and is being replaced by mainland Chinese values. They fear that Hong Kong will eventually become another major Chinese city, which is in fact one reason why Hong Kong’s young people are studying the possibility of a separatist movement.

In terms of social views, surveys have suggested that more Hong Kong people now identify as ‘Hong Kongers’ and less so as ‘Chinese,’ a phenomenon that is also observed in Taiwan. How have mainland China reacted and what can we expect China to do in the near future?

In the first few years after Hong Kong sovereignty is reverted to China in 1997, there was actually a brief period of an outburst of nationalistic pride. Initially there was a very high proportion of Hong Kong people regarding themselves as first Chinese and only secondarily Hong Kong. However, now, a great majority of young people under 40 would regard themselves as Hong Kong people first. They are also increasingly not very happy with being associated with Chinese values, such as authoritarian government, suppression of freedom and suppression of civil societies. This of course has caused alarm within the Beijing leadership. However, their reaction to this effort to promote patriotism, nationalism, amongst Hong Kong people, has not only produced no effect but has backfired, as they have alarmed the young people in Hong Kong who are accustomed to freedom of thought and expression. So efforts by the Mainland Chinese authorities to impose ideological control over HK will never succeed.

Hong Kong’s economy has been growing at a slower pace due to difficulties in its exports, lower tourist spending and a general economic slowdown in Asia. Are there repercussions on its politics? What can the government do to boost the economy?

The Hong Kong economy is now totally dependent on the Chinese economy. Thus, given the fact that it is very likely that economic growth in China – which in the past two decades was around eight to nine percent – is going to slow down to five to six percent annually, the impact on Hong Kong will be substantial. In 2016 and 2017, Hong Kong expects GDP growth of only about two percent. The only way forward is for Hong Kong to develop other areas of growth besides finance and real estate. At this stage, nobody has offered any bright solutions for the long-term prospects of Hong Kong apart from perhaps taking advantage of growth areas in China to try to create job opportunities. But of course, it is also true that at least half a million people in Hong Kong spend a significant number of their working days in the Chinese cities. So the economic integration between Hong Kong and China will be more pronounced even as the political divisions could become stronger because of the conflict of values between China and Hong Kong.

What are some of the things we should watch out for in terms of rising political tension or new economic agenda that HK might try to push forward in the short term and in the long term?

The first one is the upcoming election for the legislative council in September 2016 and chief executive election in March 2017. If in the September legislative elections, the pro-Beijing elements are able to secure a big majority, and if C.Y. Leung is reelected in March of next year, then there is a high likelihood that draconian measures including the promulgation of Article 23 (a statute on national security that will severely limit freedoms in Hong Kong) will happen very soon. This will certainly exacerbate tension in Hong Kong between the pro-democracy political parties, particularly quasi-nativist parties formed by young people, and Beijing.

Glenys Kirana CMC '16 Student Journalist
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