China has dramatically intensified its military pressure on Taiwan through war games, combat-readiness exercises, and an increase in PLA sorties across the median line. Notably, 2027 is often cited as a potential invasion or readiness date. How do you assess the 2027 invasion timeline?

We know that Xi Jinping has told his military that he wants to be ready by 2027. That doesn't necessarily mean he will attack by then, but he wants the option. There is good news and bad news in that. The good news is it suggests that he believes he is not ready now, which gives the US and Taiwan some time. The bad news is that they are planning to be ready by next year. Ultimately, whether they invade will be based on two things. First is the balance of power across the strait. If they think they can get away with an invasion by 2027, that is very concerning. Second is their perception of whether Taiwan is "slipping away." Their preference remains a "peaceful" reunification to coercing Taiwan into unifying without using force. But those two factors will ultimately influence Xi’s calculation.

You have argued that Taiwan needs to significantly increase its defense spending, while also criticizing investments in high-cost platforms like navy corvettes and their request of the F-35. If Taiwan were to meaningfully increase its defense budget, where should the money go? What capabilities best prepare Taiwan to deter or withstand a potential Chinese invasion?

I visited Taiwan less than a year ago and wrote a piece for Foreign Policy regarding my latest thinking on this. Under the new Lai government, there is a renewed focus on these issues, and they are increasing defense spending and conscription. So, they are doing a lot of the right things. However, the main thing they need to spend on is anti-ship weapons. If China were to attack, they would need to land large numbers of forces on the island, likely via amphibious landing craft. Taiwan needs to focus on capabilities that can sink those ships, such as naval mines and anti-ship missiles. While the United States can help with our submarines and long-range bombers, Taiwan’s priority should be mines, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned systems. Also, investment in inexpensive unmanned surface and under-surface vehicles can be helpful, as they could crash directly into Chinese ships and disable them effectively

Assuming that Taiwan embraces its “porcupine strategy” and develops readiness that closely aligns with US military advice, investing heavily in asymmetric defense, how robust are these defenses likely to be? Do you believe China would still be capable of executing a conventional amphibious invasion without prohibitive costs?

China has the harder task. It is always more difficult to play offense than defense, and China must project power across a body of water, which is not easy to do. The situation, in many ways, favors Taiwan and its allies. If Taiwan makes that job even harder by investing in the capabilities we discussed, it would be a very costly war for China. That said, Xi might do it anyway. For example, if Taiwan were to declare independence, I do not think he could afford to let that go. He would likely go to war even if he knew he would lose. So, while it can be very costly for China, Beijing might proceed anyway.

Besides a direct invasion, Taiwan’s status as an island makes it uniquely vulnerable to blockades, undersea cable disruption, energy and import interferences, and other forms of coercion. How severe are these logistical vulnerabilities, and what should Taiwan and the United States be doing now to prepare?

If Taiwan’s energy imports were cut off, they might only have enough energy on the island for about 12 days. Food stores are slightly better but would eventually run out. They are taking steps to become more resilient. We published a report on Taiwanese resilience through the Scowcroft Center on this topic. One example is implementing satellite systems for broadband internet access if undersea cables are cut. This is slower, but it is better than nothing. Taiwan is also developing offshore wind to provide energy if imports are halted. Ultimately, the most helpful move would be for the United States to announce that if there were a blockade, the US Navy will escort commercial ships through. This is similar to actions that we have taken in the past, such as the Berlin Airlift, and should ensure that commercial trade continues. This puts the ball back in China’s court: is Beijing willing to shoot at the US Navy to enforce a blockade or not?

You have written extensively about US nuclear policy, and in your 2023 report for the Atlantic Council, you assessed the logistics of deliberate nuclear use in a war over Taiwan. Where does US nuclear policy towards Taiwan stand today? Should the U.S. consider nuclear first use if conventional forces cannot halt a Chinese invasion force from reaching Taiwan?

Because of Taiwan’s status and the United States’s policy of strategic ambiguity, we do not have a formal defense treaty with Taiwan. Consequently, the nuclear dimension of our defense has not been clearly articulated in the way it is for Japan or NATO allies. Currently, there is no clear US nuclear policy for Taiwan. It would only become clear in a crisis or war where the President would have to make short-term decisions.

I believe we should clarify this. We would not have to change the "One China" policy, but we should say that if we decided to defend Taiwan, consistent with strategic ambiguity, that defense would include every weapon at our disposal, including nuclear weapons. As I discussed in my report, the first use of US nuclear weapons against an invasion fleet would be very effective, both in defeating the invasion and as a deterrent.