Myanmar’s recent parliamentary election is the first held since the 2021 military junta takeover. What strategic purpose might this election serve for the junta, amidst the ongoing civil war? What is notable about the USDP and the implications its election has for the future of Myanmar?

The USDP is a party staffed by former military officers and supports everything the junta does. It is not a civilian party or a political party in the classic conception of the word. The victory of the USDP has been declared a sham election by the international community for a variety of reasons. First, all the opposition party leaders are in jail, and the most publicly popular party was dissolved. Any small parties that attempted to compete in the election were quickly disqualified when the junta suspected they might gain traction with the public. Second, the military junta only controls about 30% of the territory in Myanmar, and out of around 330 national townships the junta conducted elections in just around 60. Given the election was conducted in such a small portion of the country, the results are not representative of the beliefs of the public. There have also been various irregularities in the processes of the election, such as early voting rounds which sought to obscure the election process. When numbers came back from early voting, the USDP appeared to be winning. It is also important to note the election was conducted in three phases and many people who reported voting in the first period may have been double counted in later rounds. More than anything, this election was a performance designed by the military coup to justify its governmental powers and seek legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, this election was not free, fair, or representative of the people’s desires.

What intimidation tactics or complicating factors at the polls impacted the public’s ability to vote? Are certain geographic regions of Myanmar more suppressed in their ability to vote than others?

The military junta was only able to conduct elections in around 20% of Myanmar. These areas were the only regions of the country under military control. When the junta controls a region they also have coercive power over the residents, making it easier to fake election results. Any areas not subdued by the junta are controlled by the revolutionary coalition forces, and are regions where it is difficult for the junta to force people to the polls. Within the small portion of junta-controlled regions, people may have rejected the sham election verbally, but were still forced to vote at gunpoint. Intimidation tactics also included members of the junta going to people's homes, and telling them to go vote immediately. It was also common for family members of eligible voters to be used as leverage, such as threatening to abduct people's children and force them to enlist in the military. Coercive tactics such as these were particularly common for employees of the government, who could further be threatened with unemployment and jail sentence.

ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member state, recently issued a statement saying it does not recognize the results of the election. Given the nominal history of the Five Point Plan, and policy of non-interference with member states, does ASEAN’s power pose any practical concern to the junta?

ASEAN poses a practical concern to the junta by denying it international recognition and legitimacy. The degree to which ASEAN countries have condemned the election as a sham threatens the junta’s wishes for recognition as a legitimate government. Within ASEAN, Malaysia and Indonesia have been particularly vocal about their anti-military regime stance. Interestingly, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are more supportive of the military regime but have voiced collective concern with ASEAN. The Philippines is the chair of the organization this year, and have led ASEAN to declare the Myanmar election was not free and fair. The implications of this declaration include barring Myanmar regime’s military representatives from participating in member meetings in an official capacity. Further damaging their status, Myanmar’s military junta has not complied with the Five-point Consensus plan laid out by ASEAN and signed by the chief of military junta in 2021, leading to consequences such as prohibition of voting on any initiatives. All of these factors combined mean that Myanmar is not a full functional member of ASEAN, and has been delegitimized on the national stage.

Given the military junta’s political suppression, are there possibilities for opposition parties or social movements to protest this election?

The public has found a way to protest by way of nation-wide silent strike. While crowds might not be out in the street, their opinions and presence is still being made known. The tactic of silent strikes is not new in Myanmar, and this is one of many conducted since the 2021 coup. This tactic evolved as traditional protests involving large crowds in the streets became a safety hazard, as the junta would gun people down. Silent strikes provide a safer alternative that still carries an impact. During these silent strikes, people stayed home across the nation, and merchants who had to keep their stores open cleared their shelves as part of the protest. Actions like these illustrated the total disapproval of the public towards the junta. This poses a serious reputational threat to the junta, who in response, tried to coerce people not to participate in the strikes. But, it is much harder to force people to be loud than to be silent. This is what makes these protests unique, in that they are safe, and unexpectedly difficult to squash. In addition to peaceful protest tactics, there is also armed revolutionary action across the country. On any given day there are battles happening across Myanmar. The Junta only controls about 30% of the country, and another 40% is under the control of the resistance coalition, and remaining 30% is under contest. Areas controlled by the resistance, as well as unarmed civilian areas are often targets of the junta’s relentless air strikes and bombing because the junta still retain superior air and military fire power. Despite the violence against civilians, people continue to find ways to protest.

In the upcoming presidential elections in March, what is known about who the USDP will select as their presidential candidate? 

China was a key player behind this election and hopes to influence the upcoming presidential election. It lent money to the junta to fund the election and provided electronic voting stations. China is especially known for its counterfeit products, further contributing to the sham nature of the election. It is hoping to use this election to get Myanmar under its influence, largely by choosing or coercing the next USDP presidential candidate. So far their leading candidate is the Junta Chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, who is being encouraged to take off his uniform and take on the role of Presidential candidate as a civilian. It is unlikely he will step down from his role, as it lends him the power of controlling guns and bombs, or hard power. This complicates things for China, as unless the General voluntarily steps down, he is impossible to remove as the head of the military organizational structure. In the current system created by the junta, and backed by China in the recent election, the military is the king. Without hard power, there is no power to be had. This is in stark contrast to the previous popular leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who was deeply beloved and trusted by the public. Her power being sourced from popular support threatened the junta, who put her in jail. No one knows where she is, if she is alive, or what conditions she is living in. At 80 years old, the military is scared of her due to her ability to be politically powerful outside of employing violence.