How do countries go about making a cohesive “national strategy” for space policy, such as Japan’s Basic Plan on Space Policy or the US’ National Space Policy? What do policy makers prioritize in devising these strategies and how do they differ across countries?

For any national strategy it takes a long time to reconcile the civilian, commercial and military elements. This is as true for the United States as it is for other countries, such as Japan. Japan in particular took a while to come to a cohesive national strategy as research and development was dispersed all over the place for a very long time. In the US we have also seen some of the same trends, such as commercialization and moves taken under the Department of Commerce, which have taken a long time to set in motion. The most critical element of a national strategy is the interest of the top echelons of leadership in using space for economic prosperity and defense purposes. Once the highest political leadership is on board, it makes the bureaucrats and civil servants’ jobs of designing and implementing specific policies within that broader context a bit easier. Some of the most high-profile advances of the National Space Council, for example, came recently under President Trump which led to many space policy directives that have largely been continued under the administration of President Biden. This also signals the importance of policy continuity in the US. In Japan, after a very long time, the top echelons at the Prime Minister's level also became involved in space policy making. Transformations in national strategy do not come about overnight but once you have the top leadership committed to utilizing space for economic, geopolitical or defense reasons then it makes a big difference in setting and following through with the trajectories. Of course, you also need to have people who actually understand space such as very competent strategists, lawyers, engineers and policy makers who put their ideas together and think about what it might means for their countries’ own national interests. Space is fundamental to national interest, but it is just not very well understood. 

Can you explain the functions and deficits of space treaties such as The Outer Space Treaty? Is existing international law adequate to mediate global competition in space?

The Outer Space treaty (OST) dates back to 1967 and came about during the old space race between the US and the USSR. It is one of the world's first concerted efforts at arms control and functions as a treaty of principles. It outlines a number of principles on which countries can base their outer-space activities and interpret despite changing conditions. It would be very difficult to come up with something like this in today’s geopolitical environment so it is worth thinking carefully about the principles that the then dominant powers were able to agree on. Principles such as peaceful purposes, due regard and supervisory authority really do matter in terms of offering a benchmark for how states should conduct themselves in outer space. Unfortunately, while working on the Oxford Handbook of Space Security, which has just come out, we have come to the startling takeaway that there may be a cascade of exits from the OST. Additionally, there is concern that Russia is launching a counterspace capability that is actually nuclear. So, the deficit is that with international law we don’t have the ability to force states to be bound by certain principles even though they’ve signed this treaty. We also know that they can withdraw without any consequences. 

In terms of mediating global competition in space, if all states agree on the interpretation of the treaty’s principles, then it does help in building a consensus around what is or is not peaceful. Unfortunately, today, it is not just a space race but a counterspace race where states are trying to negate the capabilities of rivals or adversaries in space. Despite the principle of peaceful purposes from the OST that is supposed to govern state activities, we're seeing worrying trends in space security. One of the latest examples of this is the possibility of a nuclear threat in space which will be catastrophic for the OST. The arms race in space is real and the fact that countries are even thinking about putting nuclear weapons in space is concerning. 

Landing on the moon is a major step in joining the “elite” of the international order. In addition to reputational advantages, what are the perceived benefits of getting into space?  

There are a number of reasons why a country might want to go to space. Some are about prestige as it a very small club of countries that can actually do it. However, commercial players are also planning to land on the moon. One of the bigger benefits of landing on the moon is reputational gains as it affects your space power standing in the international system. However, there are also potentially other advantages that are important such as resources on the moon and how they can be used and exploited for the benefit of humanity or in the national interest. Additionally, for defense reasons, states want to be part of the coalition that decides what governance is going to look like on the moon once infrastructure is built. It is hard for one power to do everything, even though the United States and China are far above the rest in the international space order. Since there is still a long way to go, we cannot be completely sure about what the perceived benefits might be, but we can certainly see some geoeconomic and geopolitical advantages, not just on the lunar surface, but also potentially for humanity down the line. 

In your book In Defense of Japan – From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, you discuss the market-to-military shift of Japan’s space production. Can you explain this concept and how it relates to or explains the success of Japan’s recent moon landing?

In 2010, when the book came out, it was very difficult to make the case that Japan was thinking of a market to military transition involving space and we wanted to showcase that it was in fact happening. Japan is a country that has a pacifist constitution, and it also had a very strict peaceful purposes resolution that governed the use of space – at least officially, rhetorically and policy-wise. The idea was to not just look at the civilian side of what the Japanese government was talking about, but also the national security implications. The book included how Japan had been engaging in space commercial and civilian matters as well as pivoting towards military aspects of space even then. In 2008, the government put forward the Basic Space Law which brought Japan up to par with the interpretations of other countries about the military uses of outer space. It sanctioned the non-aggressive military use of space and it was the first very clear indicator that Japan was officially going to make this market to military shift. And, indeed, over the past 14 years or so we have seen a trend towards the national security paradigm in Japan's space policy. This is not to say that Japan is not interested in the geoeconomic advantages, but Japan is also vigilant about the geopolitical and defense usage of space.

The market to military shift also reflects the reality of the dual-use nature of space products and services as 95% of space technology is dual-use. When it comes to space exploration it is important to evaluate space capabilities with an assessment of what exploration means for defense purposes as well. In that sense, the market is the military – it is about both dual-use purposes and national security paradigms. Lo and behold, as we finish the Oxford Handbook, we're witnessing the market to military shift in the whole architecture of space security worldwide. Countries are very cognizant that there can be economic benefits that can advance their development in many important ways; they are also equally interested in national security uses. 

Looking to Asia more broadly, there are many alliances between countries such as China, India and Japan that work toward common initiatives and goals. How do these collaborations alter the balance of powers within Asia and what ramifications might they have for the West?

The chapter that I wrote for the Oxford Handbook was called “Alliances and Balancing in the Space Domain” and it precisely answers this question. The way that I frame this issue is that we are witnessing both a US-led order and a China-led order. On the US side, one of the most important manifestations has been through the Artemis Accords, which is an agreement on the principles of setting up exploration and science – on the moon and beyond. It includes countries such as Japan, India, along with I believe thirty plus countries that have signed on to the principles and projected infrastructure for what can happen physically in cislunar space and on the moon. On the China side, there's something called the International Lunar Research Station, which includes China along with Russia, Pakistan, North Korea and others. There are definitely these alliances taking place and I would say that the international space order is bipolar. There is the US-led side and the China-led side and there is no question that both sides are competing to affect the balance of space capabilities in favor of their coalition. We can see the pieces in place but how that will translate into affecting the balance of power around and above us is a work in progress. 

In your work, you discuss many of the possibilities opened up by increased space development, such as small satellites, big data (SSBD). This technology is a double-edged sword as it improves certain government and societal functions but also leads to mass surveillance and increased possibilities for global conflicts. What do you believe are the worst case and best-case scenarios for the future of space technology?

The best use case scenario is that this fleet of satellites that is going into place benefits economic development, communication and closes the digital divide not just within countries, but across countries. Definitely a big buzzword that companies like to use is that these assets help with the “digital divide” – not just within rural and urban areas, but also across the globe. It is inspiring to see individuals harnessing the power of this technology to close the economic gap. SSBD is also extraordinarily important in disasters as this infrastructure can help guide first responders. 

The negative scenario is living in a world of constant surveillance. It is extremely important for military strategy but also a bit concerning. Stealth will mean something very different in a world of constant surveillance. An interesting angle, which the Ukraine war teaches us, is about the entanglements with commerce. If there are commercial assets on the ground, what is the responsibility of the government? Should we have alternative infrastructure for national security purposes? If governments buy out commercial capabilities, how do we know if they are going to be stable? Additionally, once you have these assets on the ground, as more and more of our capabilities are linked to space, how do you know in a war, that if an adversary gains territorial advantages, they can’t also use the same assets you thought were a decisive advantage? States may lose control and we don’t know if we can shut this infrastructure off. These things have to be carefully thought through. What is the responsibility of the government to defend and should the flag follow trade? We are not completely sure about how all this is going to play out. 

Another profound question that the Ukraine war has raised is how do you convert what are effectively terrestrial alliances like NATO into something that also involves a strategic domain like space? While there are wonderful things to be excited about with SSBD, there are also things we have to be concerned about on the defense side. Decision makers, regulators, lawyers, diplomats and strategists need to work very hard. As long as, to the extent possible, we currently have legal and regulatory policy frameworks in place that help us to address some of these emerging challenges, then these are the questions we need to consider. Countries also need to think very carefully from a national interest perspective, whether or not all these architectures like SSBD give countries a decisive advantage in wartime. We can see advantages in peacetime, but the question to ask is, does it give you a decisive advantage in a wartime situation? And, as we learn more about technology and see that space intersects with almost all emerging and disruptive technologies, we know that now is the time to begin thinking about these things, not in 20 years but now.