For much of 2023 to 2024, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been beset with scandals and low approval ratings. Why did Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, installed as party and national leader in September, call an election in October 2024 when he could have waited another year?

The LDP’s popularity was falling after a slush fund scandal. Fumio Kishida, former prime minister and LDP leader, decided to step down, hoping his successor could help improve the LDP’s popularity. The LDP chose Ishiba because he was seen as a clean, reform-minded contrarian. His outsider reputation and apparent willingness to challenge the party leadership were relatively popular with the public.

He called the elections thinking that his image would help the party do well. He was wrong. There was a bit of arrogance in that calculation. Ishiba was only in power for a month; you cannot turn around a party's standing that quickly. What’s more, in that short time, he backtracked on challenging the party leadership in many areas and refused to hold a budget debate. This led to some feeling that he was just more of the same.

The public also did not overlook the problems that preceded Ishiba, such as corruption and a weak economy. These issues are not something you can “fix” in a year or so anyway. For that reason, it might not have mattered so much when Ishiba chose to call the election. Even if he had called it later, the LDP might still have lost. Interestingly, the voter turnout in this election was the third lowest in modern Japanese history. By U.S. standards, it wasn't terrible, but it showed little enthusiasm for the LDP.

Why did the LDP lose its majority in the lower house of the Diet, Japan’s national Legislature?

Corruption was the main issue. The slush fund scandal involved about $4 million in unreported campaign donations put into secret funds by two factions within the LDP, one of which was the faction of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. This seemed to suggest that the LDP is controlled by self-dealing politicians who do not care about the country. The LDP has a long-standing reputation for being corrupt, so the slush fund scandal further confirmed the negative view that many, especially older Japanese, had about the party.

The other issue was the economy. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan’s economy has been doing poorly. GDP growth was less than 1% in 2022, and it has improved only a little since. Inflation has been higher than in the US. The public was pretty unhappy with the LDP’s management of the economy.

Currently, no party has a majority. What does this mean for Ishiba’s agenda or the survival of his premiership? Would there be more dysfunction, or could different parties in the Diet find a way to work together?

I think we are looking at a period of deadlock. For example, the LDP has been pushing to maintain the consumption tax rate, since this is a major revenue producer, and the government needs to pay down its debt. However, one of the minority parties that did well in the election, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), has been calling for a major cut to the consumption tax. There is now tremendous division, with many different views in the Diet about what to do with the tax system and on other policy issues.

The LDP has had a large majority with its junior partner Komeito in the Diet for the past decade or so. That majority is gone, so no important legislation can be enacted by the Japanese government unless the different parties can come to agreement. The LDP could stay in power in the short term, but it only has 30 days to put together a governing coalition if it wishes to stay in power longer than that. Alternatively, the LDP could continue as a minority government and form ad hoc alliances with minor parties to pass each piece of legislation. Either way, there will be more time spent on bargaining than on writing and passing legislation.

Is the LDP more likely to negotiate a coalition government with an opposition party or negotiate with minor parties to pass every legislation? Is something else more likely going to happen, such as all opposition parties coming together to depose the LDP?

Ishiba may invite the DPP and Ishin, along with Komeito, to join with the LDP and create a majority coalition. Many opposition parties, however, have said that they do not want to be part of an LDP-led coalition; the LDP is far apart from most of these parties on many issues, such as budget and tax policy, as I just mentioned. On the other hand, even small parties would enjoy real power by entering into a governing coalition, so some of them might be tempted to join an LDP-led coalition and renege on what they said. It's really hard to tell at this point.

Thirty years ago, a broad, non-LDP coalition coalesced and ousted the ruling party. But it lasted only about eleven months in office. Likewise, there is so much disagreement today among the opposition parties that I have difficulty imagining a stable outcome from all the bargaining. For example, on foreign policy, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) is quite dovish compared to other opposition parties, especially Ishin (Japan Innovation Party), which is hawkish. I do not see a broad anti-LDP coalition being able to come together, especially one that includes Ishin and the CDP. They are just so far apart on foreign policy.

Another possible outcome is that the LDP may decide to get rid of Prime Minister Ishiba and get a new, perhaps younger, and more popular candidate to run in a new election. In Israel, which has a parliamentary structure that is similar to Japan’s, there were several back-to-back elections until Prime Minister Netanyahu cobbled together a very right-wing governing coalition for the Knesset. Similarly, in Japan, it may take new elections to resolve the current impasse.

Although the CDP and Ishin disagree on foreign policy, especially towards China, other parties agree with the LDP in this policy area. To what extent are opposition gains driven by policy differences as opposed to just a protest vote against the LDP?

The LDP and some minority parties like Ishin share relatively hawkish positions on foreign policy, but on economic policy, they are quite different. I think this election turned on economic policy and the general perception of the LDP as corrupt, not foreign policy. Voters, especially younger voters, were attracted to the ambitious economic and social policy agenda of some opposition parties, such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). I was struck by how specific and concrete some of their policies were. For example, they called for the installation of air conditioners in every school gymnasium, and they were outspoken on reducing taxes for Japanese families. That was quite attractive and refreshing, especially for younger and middle-aged Japanese voters who see the LDP as vague and confusing on policy, or just not as exciting.

Speaking about being hawkish, most leading Japanese politicians in the LDP and many opposition parties support taking a hardline position on China. To what extent is this driven by a failure of Japan to reconcile with its neighbors, as you outline in your book, Ghosts in the Neighborhood?

China-Japan relations have been tense for a long time, and part of this has to do with what I discuss in my latest book. China is hostile toward Japan in part because many Chinese feel that Japan has failed to apologize for, or fully acknowledge, its past actions, including two imperialist invasions. Many also believe Japan has failed to recognize fully its war crimes in China, such as the Nanjing Massacre or the awful experiments on live humans in Harbin. In my book, I show that, since the 1990s, Japan actually has apologized to China many times for its misbehavior, especially during World War II – but to no avail. There is now weariness among many Japanese about this insistence that Japan apologize again or more sincerely. Apology fatigue is increasingly common on the right in Japan. The left, which is much weaker than it used to be, remains critical of Japan's military past.

The history issue continues to haunt Japan’s relations with China. But there are other complicating issues, such as the ongoing territorial dispute between the two countries over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. And there is a general anxiety, especially among establishment conservatives in Japan, that China's rising power threatens Japan and the existing regional order.

I think that the U.S. encourages Japan to share its view of China as a growing challenge to the U.S.-led order in East Asia. For almost 80 years, Japan has been a cog in the region’s U.S.-sponsored security machinery. There is now a strongly held belief among most Japanese politicians that the nation has benefited, especially economically, by serving as a junior partner to the U.S., which is regarded as a benevolent patron providing a nuclear umbrella over Japan. Of course, when you visit Okinawa or talk to people on the left, there is a very different feeling that the U.S. is pushing Japan into a confrontation with China. But otherwise, there is an increasingly widespread view that Japan has been and will be better off if the U.S. continues to be the leader in the world and East Asia.

Ishiba is one of the leading Japanese politicians who favors engaging with China while still being hawkish. Are there any important areas for engagement that he would favor, and what are the main barriers to improving China-Japan relations in today's domestic climate?

Ishiba is not likely to be able to do much in the short or medium term because of the political crisis at home. But if there were a domestic breakthrough, Japan might end up cooperating more closely with China on things like overseas foreign aid and development assistance in Cambodia, Laos, and elsewhere. Leaders from the two countries already have talked about deepening cooperation on infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia, which could be one area of collaboration between Japan and China. The biggest obstacle to enhanced cooperation with China is what I call the “Alliance Village,” a network of American and Japanese bureaucrats, think tanks, pundits, journalists, and academics who have been involved in the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance for many decades and are committed to maintaining and strengthening the alliance. Members of this “village” tend to oppose deeper Japanese engagement with China.

In November 2024, the U.S. will have its presidential election. What direct and indirect impact would a victory for Donald Trump have on U.S.-Japan relations?

We often evaluate the future based on the past. When Trump was president from 2017 through 2020, he insisted that Japan needed to do more; specifically, he called on Tokyo to shoulder a larger burden for financing U.S. military bases in Japan and to increase Japanese military spending. Japan now pays around 70-75% of the overall cost of hosting U.S. bases on Japanese soil. I am not sure that Trump understands that Japanese taxpayers already cover much of the cost of hosting U.S. troops. Tokyo also has yielded to U.S. pressure by breaking its long-standing pledge of limiting defense spending to 1% of GDP. Military spending is now approaching 2% of GDP. Trump will likely say that that is still not enough and push for more, which could strain U.S.-Japan relations. Ishiba has also proposed to increase Japan's role in the command and control of US military operations on Japanese soil. I do not know how Trump would respond to such a proposal, but I imagine he would prefer to have greater if not entirely unilateral US authority,

Trump’s more isolationist (“America First”) position also poses some real economic problems for Tokyo. Japan is a major exporter to the U.S., but Trump previously called for higher tariffs on Japanese products. Tariffs could rise again in a potential second term. Ishiba, who does not have deep connections in Washington, might not be able to develop the personal relationship that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had with Trump. Abe and Trump were friends who golfed together, which mitigated the impact of Trump’s otherwise damaging policy positions. Ishiba would struggle to do the same.