Soviet policies towards national minorities often promoted a complex mix of integration and suppression of distinct national identities. How has President Putin approached the question of national identity in post-Soviet Russia over the past two decades? Does he embrace and promote a multi-ethnic identity or one based more distinctly on Russian ethnicity and the Russian language? 

There's no straightforward answer to this. The Soviet Union’s policies were notoriously contradictory. Though it was a federation of multiple ethnic republics, no one was truly "Soviet." Critically, it emphasized ethnic identities, with 14 of its 15 constituent republics defined by specific nationalities. Because each republic was associated with a particular nationality, discrimination against specific groups was common. For instance, in Georgia, Armenians could face discrimination, while in Armenia, Georgians could face the same. Many argue that this ethnic federalism contributed to the Soviet Union's collapse. By fostering strong local national identities, the system undermined full allegiance to the Soviet Union and created large Russian minorities outside of Russia. When the Soviet Union did dissolve, approximately 20 million ethnic Russians were left in newly independent states, a demographic Putin later exploited for political leverage.

When Putin came to power, he had to address the ethnic nationalism that had surged in Russia. Regions like Chechnya pushed for independence, while others, like Tatarstan, wielded significant autonomy due to their economic resources. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was a federation of ethnic republics, post-Soviet Russia combined ethnic republics with territorial units. Ethnic Russians made up about 55% of the Soviet Union’s population by 1989 but constituted roughly 75% of Russia’s population at the time. Under Putin, Russia pivoted toward centralization and reversed the relative autonomy of regional governments. This was achieved through various methods, such as forcing local governments to hand over control over significant assets like oil and gas companies, or changing educational policies. For example, Russia introduced a national matriculation exam called the EG, a discipline-based exam which shared some elements with standardized American college exams. The test effectively undermined local nationalist efforts, with a key example being the diminished use of local languages as complete fluency of Russian was needed to successfully complete the exams. 

Chechnya, however, remains a special case. Its governance is essentially a personal arrangement between Putin and the local leadership, where law and order are guaranteed in exchange for subsidies and autonomy. This dynamic becomes crucial when examining how these policies have been used in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea in 2014, during the more recent war in 2022, and in various threats to the Baltics. At the heart of this is the question: Who is Russia?

Historically, Russia was an imperial state with various definitions of identity. For instance, when discussing the 20 million people who ended up outside Russian territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the definitions become murky. Some are ethnic Russians, some are Russian speakers but not ethnically Russian, and others culturally identify as Russian for diverse reasons. This fluidity allows the regime to manipulate identity for political gain. For example, the term “Russian-speaking minorities” is used interchangeably with “Russians” to inflate numbers and justify intervention, particularly in the Baltics and Ukraine. 

For example, in 2014, Crimea’s majority ethnic Russian population provided a basis for annexation; however, in places like Donbas, the situation is more complex, as Russian speakers there are not necessarily ethnic Russians. In Eastern Ukraine, much like bilingual regions in Canada, the dominant language is Russian, but the farther west you go, Ukrainian becomes more prevalent amongst the people. Because of this, one could opine that the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine takes place largely in Russian-speaking areas, giving it elements of a civil war. This contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union, which had a rigid, institutionalized structure. Today’s Russian policies involve improvisation and a mix of formal and informal deals as a means to control the country’s influence.

During the Soviet era for the brief time (1917-1924), there was even a Ministry of Nationalities. In the 1990s, there were attempts by sociologists and demographers to create a civic Russian nation, unifying citizens of the Russian Federation under a collectively shared identity. The Russian language has distinct terms for ethnic Russians ("Russkiy") and citizens of the Russian Federation ("Rossiyanin"), but these terms are often used interchangeably for political convenience. One Soviet-era practice that ended after communism was listing ethnic identity on internal IDs. Previously, a person’s ethnicity was fixed and could not be changed. Mixed-heritage individuals were allowed one lifetime choice of which parent’s ethnicity to adopt, and while the government no longer includes ethnic identity on official documents, it still collects data on ethnicity.

This manipulation of concepts—“Russian,” “Soviet Russian,” and “persecuted Russian minorities”—remains central to the regime’s rhetoric, particularly in justifying actions in the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The Caucasus has been a focal point for ethnic conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union. How does ethno-nationalism in Russia intersect with regional identities in Russia and the near abroad, namely in areas like Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh?

The Caucasus is rich with diverse ethnicities, each with varying degrees of status, dependent on the Soviet Union's hierarchy of ethnic groups. Today, however, ethnicity is typically defined by one's ancestral homeland, even if the individual has lived in a different location for generations. For instance, an Armenian living in Moscow for ten generations would still be considered Armenian, because their identity is tied to the nation or the Soviet Republic of Armenia, even if they have never lived in the land of their ancestors.

The Northern Caucasus is characterized by its poverty, underdevelopment, and high population growth, which have created complex socio-economic issues, further exacerbated by subsidies from Russia. The region is largely Muslim, with a rapidly growing population and limited opportunities due to its historical underdevelopment. This has resulted in a host of issues, including criminal activity, emigration, and the spread of radical ideologies. These issues affect most republics in the Northern Caucasus, with the exception of Ossetia which is majority Christian. 

Each region's sense of nationalism is shaped in different ways. Chechen nationalism dates back to the 1940s, during which Stalin accused the Chechens of collaborating with the Nazis and forcibly deported them to Central Asia, leading to widespread suffering and death. Although other regions in the Northern Caucasus did not experience this level of trauma, the memory of the Chechen expulsion remains a powerful force behind Chechen nationalism. While not economically viable, this nationalism has persisted, sometimes intertwining with radical Islam due to the region’s poverty.

Russia's approach to managing the Northern Caucasus is one of containment. Local leaders, often-with limited ties to the region, are given significant authority over their areas and control the region through a mix of economic subsidies and political influence. Their rule is often maintained through corruption and coercion rather than genuine local support, as the ethnic and religious diversity of the Northern Caucasus makes it particularly challenging for Moscow to govern. With numerous competing groups, Russia has to carefully manage these dynamics to avoid conflict and effectuate its control. The recent riots at Makhachkala Airport (in the Republic of Dagestan), in which locals targeted Jews, are just one example of the tensions that exist. This volatile environment also contributes to the region's reliance on the military. Due to limited economic opportunities, the Northern Caucasus has long been a source of disproportionately high recruitment for the Russian army. Though the future of the region remains uncertain, Russia has been heavily investing in these areas, and money often buys time.

The situation in the Southern Caucasus is quite different. In Georgia, Russia has exploited local ethnic conflicts since the 1990s to effectively occupy 20% of the country. Russia's influence was particularly strong in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where tensions between ethnic Georgians and these groups have fueled longstanding grievances. Russia's intervention helped establish control over these regions, and while Georgia still claims them as part of its territory, these areas have never been fully integrated by the Georgian state. Russia continued to solidify its presence in the regions after the 2008 war with Georgia, leading to continual fear of Georgia being occupied by Russia. This in turn affects Georgia's stance towards Ukraine and other neighboring states under similar pressure.

Russia also attempted to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Historically, Russia's role resembled that of an enabler, providing indirect support to Armenia, which was pushing for the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite a lack of international recognition and support, the region historically operated as a de facto part of Armenia. However, after a lack of Russian intervention contributed to Nagorno-Karabakh’s dissolution, Armenia is taking steps to expel the Russian military presence entirely. Though Armenia is seeking to establish more solid relationships with Western powers, we don’t know how much the Europeans and the Americans are willing to aid Armenia as it seeks to replace Russia. 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan seeks to gain further control over the region, particularly in terms of controlling territorial corridors that could further isolate Armenia. Azerbaijan, because it's rich in oil, has managed to preserve its independence and maintain relationships with both Russia and the West. This is happening, despite facing challenges from neighboring Iran, with which Armenia has a more favorable relationship. The geopolitics in this region are shaped by resource-based interests, with both Armenia and Azerbaijan vying for influence among different global powers.

Russia has deepened its ties with countries like Syria and Iran, presenting itself as a counterbalance to U.S. and European power. Do you view Russia’s growing influence in the Middle East as a response to its strained relations with the West, particularly after its invasion of Ukraine?

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained a dominant presence in the Middle East, supporting client states like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria with military and economic aid. However, shifts in alliances during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly Egypt’s pivot to the West, reduced this influence. Though Putin has made efforts to reassert Russian power in the region, post-Soviet Russia continues to face challenges in regaining a comparable foothold, instead focusing on selective, strategic partnerships.

Since the 1990s, Russia has cultivated its relationship with Iran through arms sales and political alliances. Despite early opposition to assisting Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Russia built the Bushehr nuclear reactor, a civilian facility scrutinized by the West but unlinked to weaponization. Further, as U.S. pressure to limit Russian-Iranian ties proved ineffective, Russia began to sell advanced military equipment to Iran, including anti-aircraft systems, allowing Iran to become a cornerstone of Russia’s Middle East strategy. When evaluating Russia and Iran’s shared objectives in Syria, Russia’s airpower was decisive in preserving Bashar al-Assad’s regime, while Iranian militias handled much of the ground conflict. But imbalances persist. For instance, Iran’s reliance on Russian military support in Syria strengthens its regional influence, while Russia exploits economic opportunities created by Western sanctions on Iran. 

Looking towards Syria, Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad's regime and the intervention in the Syrian Civil War marked a turning point in Russian re-engagement in the Middle East. Moscow’s intervention aimed to stabilize Assad’s regime and secure its strategic military base in Tartus, a move both practical and ideological as Russia sought to counter U.S.-led interventions and prevent a precedent of a populist toppling of authoritarian allies. Russian forces focused on air campaigns and collaborated with private military companies like the Wagner Group, while Iran and Hezbollah managed ground operations. Russia’s motivations went beyond combating ISIS, however. Its unilateral approach, often bypassing potential collaboration with the U.S., showcased Russian ambition to assert dominance in the region. 

[The collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024, took place despite Russia’s last-minute efforts to save its client. As a consequence, Russian ambition in the Middle East suffered a significant blow. With its influence diminished and its bases in the country facing very uncertain future under the new Syrian regime, Russia would try to strengthen its ties to Iran, its only remaining ally in the region. Updated December 31, 2024.]

Now, Russia continues to be faced with the negative effects that the invasion of Ukraine has had on its Middle East strategy. The war in Ukraine has isolated Russia from typical weapons suppliers, pushing Russian reliance on Iran for critical arms supplies and drones and giving Iran significant strategic advantages. Additionally, Russia’s ability to maintain its presence in Syria has weakened, as arms resources are redirected to Ukraine. Israel, for instance, continues to strike Iranian and Syrian positions with little resistance from Russia, highlighting the limits of Moscow’s influence.

How has Russian foreign policy toward Israel evolved during Putin’s tenure in office? What are the main consequences of the war in Gaza for Russia’s current relations with Israel? 

Following the efforts of his predecessors, Putin initially sought to improve relations with Israel. These efforts included diplomatic proposals, such as the visa-free travel agreements in 2008, which made it easier for citizens of both countries to visit each other. Additionally, Putin’s visits to Israel (2007 & 2012) were significant, as he was the first Russian leader in years to make such efforts after a visit from President Medvedev was canceled in 2011 due to strike of the Israeli Foreign Ministry employees. In regards to trade, the economic ties between the two nations remained minimal, as trade was largely restricted to low-value goods, such as agricultural products. While the efforts to improve diplomatic relations marked a clear intent to build a stronger bilateral relationship and showcase Russia’s willingness to engage with Israel on a political level, they did not translate into a robust strategic partnership. 

Indeed, the recent war in Gaza has worsened the existing tensions between Russia and Israel. The October 7 Hamas attacks highlighted Russia’s controversial relationship with the group. Russia’s refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and its decision to maintain a quasi-embassy for Hamas were points of contention for Israel. Russia’s engagement with Hamas is based in the belief that open dialogue with all parties, including those deemed unacceptable by the West, is essential for negotiating solutions in Gaza and beyond. Russian desires to be viewed as a mediator clash significantly with Israel, which engages with Hamas as a direct threat.

Restoring Soviet-era influence over the Middle East also clashes with Russia’s efforts to maintain good relations with Israel. For example, Russia’s reliance on Iran deepened its alignment with actors like Hezbollah, undermining its credibility as a neutral partner for Israel. Additionally, Russia’s broader geopolitical strategy of opposing the United States has led to greater cooperation with Iran, with its willingness to engage with groups like Hamas. These were seen as moves to counter U.S. influence in the Middle East. These alignments stemming from Russia’s anti-Western stance continue to strain its relationship with Israel, especially given Israel's delicate balancing act of managing its relationship with Russia while confronting Iran's growing influence in the region.