Munitions shipments and alleged missile transfers are just two examples of North Korea’s military support for Russia, intensifying over the past year. What does North Korea hope to achieve through this collaboration, beyond immediate economic benefits?

For North Korea, this is an opportunity to modernize its military. The country has been under sanctions for many years, and Russia and China had previously abided by those sanctions. As a result, North Korea’s military—especially its land-based forces—has become very outdated.

The war in Ukraine has provided an opportunity for North Korea to learn about modern battlefield techniques, particularly the use of drones. North Korea has been able to leverage its large military force in exchange for technology transfers that help modernize its capabilities.

Russia has trained North Korean soldiers, some 15,000 who have been fighting for Russia in Kursk Oblast, in drone operations and other new battlefield techniques. There was also a recent report that 12,000 North Korean workers will be manufacturing drones inside Russia. If accurate, this workforce would be significant as North Korea tries to produce its own drones domestically. There is also evidence that Russia is supplying North Korea with the technology to manufacture the Shahed drones, originally provided to Russia by Iran.

Some reports claim that Russia is compensating North Korea with food, fuel, and military technology. In your opinion, how credible are these claims, and what kinds of technology transfers would most significantly advance North Korea’s defense capabilities?

These claims are quite credible, especially because we have satellite imagery showing trains and shipping activity between Russia and North Korea. Previously, Russia supplied fuel to North Korea, so that is not a major departure. But the military transfers are a major change.

What we do not know for certain is exactly which weapons systems Russia is providing. The South Korean defense minister recently suggested that submarine technology is likely included, and there are other reports about aircraft technology. These would fit the pattern of areas where North Korea is relatively weak and needs additional support.

Open-source information does not provide complete detail, but South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence have been the main sources behind these assessments.

Russia’s turn to North Korea suggests a practical need, but this turn may also be seen as geopolitically symbolic. What does this partnership reveal about Russia’s current position in the global order, and how does it fit into Russia’s broader effort to sustain its war in Ukraine despite international isolation?

This is a big question. In terms of sustaining the war in Ukraine, North Korea has been important. Russia has faced manpower shortages and even saw Ukrainian forces occupy parts of Russian territory in  Kursk Oblast. By deploying North Korean soldiers, Russia was able to counter Ukraine’s strategy of diverting Russian forces.

North Korea also provided ammunition at a time when Russia was running low. Symbolically, it showed that Russia still has friends despite efforts to isolate it.

In the broader picture, Russia has always sought influence on the Korean Peninsula—it participated in the Six-Party Talks—but China was usually viewed as the primary actor, given that it provides 90 percent of North Korea’s trade. Now, with a military alliance in place, Russia has gained additional leverage over North Korea and a greater voice in shaping the peninsula’s stability.

This partnership also helps Russia confront what it perceives as increased challenges from the United States and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. The complicated variable is South Korea. Moscow previously valued a good relationship with Seoul, but Russia’s support for North Korea now makes engagement with South Korea more difficult, which could be a loss for Russian foreign policy.

How has international pressure shaped North Korean and Russian cooperation? Might this partnership signal new sanctions-evasion ecosystems emerging among authoritarian states?

Both countries are relatively impervious to international pressure. Both have been under sanctions for a long time, and it is hard to imagine conditions becoming significantly worse for them because of this cooperation.

Russia is more concerned about whether South Korea might dramatically increase its support for Ukraine. South Korea does not directly provide lethal aid to Ukraine but supports the United States and other partners, who in turn supply Ukraine. It is a kind of backstop system. With South Korea’s new president showing more interest in engaging North Korea, it is not clear whether Seoul would intensify pressure.

China abstained from the UN resolution that Russia vetoed regarding sanctions on North Korea. China does not want instability on the Korean Peninsula. It shares a border with North Korea, but it also opposes interference in states’ domestic affairs. China has been engaging more with South Korea and Japan, but it is not directly criticizing the alliance between North Korea and Russia. We do sense that China is not very pleased with the new Russia–North Korea military alliance; there has been some distancing, but the details remain unclear.

Regarding sanction-evasion ecosystems, I would say there are bilateral efforts to exchange or acquire technologies, but not a new multilateral, institutionalized evasion network. China is far more integrated into the global economy and is careful not to appear overtly in violation of sanctions, though it continues to support Russia through alternative shipping arrangements and other methods.

You have written about Russia’s partnerships in Asia as part of a shifting global order. Do you see Russian–North Korean cooperation as a temporary wartime convenience, or the foundation of a more enduring strategic alignment in the area of security?

Historically, Russia had a long-term alliance with North Korea, but it became inactive in the 1990s as Russia sought engagement with Western countries. When Putin came to power, he redirected attention to North Korea, and now we see a revived alliance.

Whether this alliance endures will depend on several factors: the outcome of the war in Ukraine, which partners Russia can retain in the future, and the trajectory of U.S.–Russia relations. Some in Russia are nostalgic for better ties with South Korea and would like more balance in the region. For now, that is not a realistic option.

Russia may continue to feel that it needs an ally in the Indo-Pacific to counter pressure from the United States and Japan. Therefore, I do see this as a strategic alignment, though not necessarily a long-term one.

Do we know anything about how the contribution of soldiers from North Korea is seen at home, especially as casualties mount?

There have been anecdotal reports of North Koreans trying to avoid deployment by claiming they had tuberculosis, and a black market for positive test results may have emerged. There are also reports that some soldiers did not even know where they were being sent.

The soldiers receive modest compensation, but deserters—or their families—face severe consequences. Kim Jong Un is certainly aware of the losses. There was a public ceremony honoring families of fallen soldiers, and Russia is reportedly building a monument to them in Pyongyang.

The government is framing these casualties in heroic terms to maintain the pipeline of soldiers, which is lucrative for the regime. North Korea takes the lion’s share of the payments Russia provides, making this partnership both a financial and technological lifeline.

Please note: these are Dr. Wishnick’s personal views and do not represent those of CNA or its sponsors.