Pakistan has maintained a deep commitment to Kashmir for decades, framing it as central to its national identity and territorial integrity. Why, in your view, does Pakistan continue to prioritize Kashmir, and do you foresee this commitment continuing forward?

Yes, Pakistan's commitment to Kashmir has been there since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, and it's been a relentless quest. Whenever opportunities have arisen, Pakistan has never failed to try to exploit those opportunities. For example, for a long time, Pakistan's commitment to Kashmir was irredentist in the sense that it had to gather Muslims in an adjoining state to Pakistan, because otherwise Pakistan's identity would be incomplete. Pakistan ultimately had been created as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, and the “K” in Pakistan stands for Kashmir. This commitment made sense all the way until 1971, which is when Pakistan broke apart. Why did it break apart? It broke apart because of the rise of linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan and Pakistan's brutal attempt to suppress that nationalist movement. This ultimately caused the tragedy of the East Pakistan Crisis of March 1971, leading to the creation of the state of Bangladesh with India's military intervention. However, if Islam alone was no longer the basis for holding the two wings of Pakistan together, then what claim did Pakistan have on the Muslims of Kashmir? If it could not keep Bengali Muslims within its fold, and if language. another marker of identity, came to the fore, then Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir would become hollow. It could not claim Kashmir on the basis of religious identity. Consequently, as I have argued in print that after 1971, Pakistan's irredentist claim to Kashmir no longer holds water.

Much of the literature on the Kashmir conflict frames Pakistan’s strategy as deeply flawed and highly costly. At least publicly, Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic elite support the country’s strategy on Kashmir. To what extent is this support best understood as a continuation of the status quo that serves them, particularly with the military’s deep economic ties? Or is there another explanation you find more persuasive?

Absolutely, the latter. There has been a consideration, on the part of the Pakistani military establishment, harking back to the 1950s. They have consistently exaggerated the threat from India. They have seized upon a handful of careless statements on the part of Indian politicians, particularly from the Indian right wing, and they have woven a tale of an intransigent India, an utterly bellicose India, and only the Pakistan army can ensure the security and the integrity of the Pakistani state. They have been able to reinforce this argument after 1971, even though Pakistan's policies led to the uprising in East Pakistan in the first place. Yes, India did intervene. Yes, India did give rise to the genesis of Bangladesh. But it's only after a brutal military crackdown in East Pakistan and the flight of about 9.8 million people into India shortly after March 1971 that India felt compelled to intervene. Admittedly, certain Indian strategists saw this as a marvelous opportunity to break up Pakistan and to reduce the threat from Pakistan. But the point is that had that crisis not taken place, there would not have been the breakup of Pakistan. Certainly, you might have had growing tensions between East and West, but it's the Pakistani army's actions that precipitated this crisis in the first place. Given that India helped give birth to Bangladesh, the Pakistani army has very deftly made the argument that the next goal is to vivisect West Pakistan, even though there is no evidence of Indian plans. Even the most risk- prone Indian military strategist would not contemplate that, particularly after Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

You have written that the Second Kashmir War was shaped with a perceived “window of opportunity”, where Pakistan saw it necessary to strike before India became too strong. Decades later, conflicts on the border continue, with a very significant incursion in May of 2025. If the “window of opportunity” ended with India’s increased power, what informed the decades of continued fighting, particularly the recent attack?

The window of opportunity again arose, this time because of India's shortcomings. The insurgency in Kashmir that took place in 1989 was not the product of Pakistan; it had to do with the shortcomings of Indian federalism. India's machinations in the internal politics of Kashmir, which led to growing discontent amongst the younger, better-educated population in Kashmir, were exploited by Pakistan. Pakistan chose to make the insurgency much more virulent through the provision of sanctuaries, training, and arms. It also gave it an ideological overlay. So, had it not been for India's shortcomings, I doubt that you would have had that insurgency in the first place. Did Pakistan exploit it and worsen it and deepen it? No question about it. But let's be honest, the origins of the insurgency can be traced to the exigencies of Indian domestic politics and the relationship between the center and the Indian-controlled portion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, the more recent events can be explained by the unhappiness in the Kashmir Valley. Following the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in August 2019, which had granted Kashmir a special status in the Indian Union, again gave rise to growing discontent in the valley, which is predominantly Muslim. Which, surprise, surprise, Pakistan is choosing to exploit as a new window of opportunity.

What role does public opinion in Jammu and Kashmir play in the conflict? Some polling suggests a significant portion of the population of Kashmir favors independence. Does this sentiment strengthen either country’s position, and how does the desire for independence complicate each country’s strategic goals?

Certain polls confirm the hypothesis that, left to themselves, the Muslims in the valley predominantly would have chosen independence over joining Pakistan and over staying with India. That may not be true everywhere. I'm sure it's not true of Ladakh, which is predominantly Buddhist. The Shia population also does not want to go to Pakistan. It is certainly not true of Jammu, which is predominantly Hindu. So yes, a certain segment of Kashmir probably would like independence. The Ladakhi know independence would be very tenuous. It would last a few weeks. They would be incorporated into Pakistan. And with the Hindus of Jammu, the last thing they want is to go to Pakistan.

To what extent is the conflict shaped by BJP ideology and Prime Minister Modi’s own personal goals, and to what extent is the conflict a more durable expression of Indian state power that would continue even in a government led by the INC?

You would lose this exclusivist nationalism, which is characteristic of the Modi government. Were an INC government to come to power with a majority, or even through a coalition, the commitment to the territorial integrity of India, as understood by Indian elites, would remain in place. You might see a return of negotiations with Pakistan to restore some degree of diplomatic normalcy, some attempt at again softening borders, perhaps some discussion of restoring Kashmir autonomy. All of those things are feasible. But the one issue on which no party, regardless of political affiliation, is going to accept is a change of borders. Territorial adjustments are simply off the table.

What role, if any, does China play in the conflict over Kashmir? The recent meeting between India and China and the highly publicized “dragon and elephant will tango” statement suggest the potential for closer ties. How might this alter Pakistan’s calculations in the region?

The prospect of a Sino-Indian rapprochement is as likely as a snowstorm hitting us today here in Claremont, California. There are fundamental differences beyond the territorial dispute that characterize this bilateral relationship, and consequently, this seeming bonhomie that was recently displayed between Putin, Xi, and Modi was merely tactical, in large part because of their current differences with the United States. This is not the beginning of a new chapter in Sino-Indian relations, and the relationship with Pakistan and the PRC remains as robust as ever. During the recent Pahalgam Crisis, I have it on very good authority that China provided real-time satellite imagery and intelligence to Pakistan, and the Indians have papered over all of that. I brought this up recently in something I wrote, which caused a certain amount of heartburn in New Delhi, because they don't want to be reminded of that fact. There is open-source reporting on that subject by reliable newspapers and news outlets. As the Chinese characterize it, the Sino-Pakistani relationship is deeper than the oceans and higher than the mountains. They also call it an all-weather relationship. For Pakistan, China is one of their few allies, if any. Moreover, China has invested so much in that relationship that it will not walk away from any time soon.