What explains the timing and motivation behind the Israeli and American strikes on nuclear facilities and top Iranian leaders in June?

That timing has to do with the calculations of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who by late spring or early summer had decided there was a chance Iran could offer a deal that the Trump officials, based on what they were saying publicly, could endorse. The chance of another nuclear agreement with Iran, but this time signed by Donald Trump, was one that Netanyahu likely did not want to risk, as it would run against Israeli interests.

However, now the Iranians think that the negotiations may have been an engineered campaign to make Iranian officials lower their guard by making them believe talks were genuinely underway. Believing there would not be any threat of military attack made them vulnerable to outside attack even more. The United States knew all along that Israel was going to strike, letting the Iranians think that they were on the diplomatic track, when, in reality, they were on a military track.

It's hard to know exactly what explains the timing, but President Trump had said Iran would be in a tough spot if there was no agreement after 60 days. Since President Trump is known to shift deadlines, this warning was not taken seriously. Netanyahu, however, clearly thought that his window for action was closing, which likely accounts for the timing of the attack.

Given these strikes, what do we know about Iran’s current ability to continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and how might Iran’s approach change following these strikes?

We do not have a clear post-strike assessment of how much damage was done to the Iranian nuclear facilities. The most advanced site, Fordow, is mostly underground, while Natanz is much easier to evaluate because it's above ground. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s assessments, which Donald Trump did not approve of, the strikes had likely set the Iranian program back by about two months. In the past two and a half months, the Iranians have not made any public statements about this, which is strategic as they do not wish to reveal how damaged their program is. Foreign intelligence agencies, if you read between the lines of reporting in the New York Times or European newspapers, generally place the setback between two and a half and six months.

However, everyone agrees that this was not a devastating blow that Iran could not come back from. The key question is whether the Iranian leadership has the willpower to either rebuild or leave the program where it is and focus on other priorities. Iran is nearly bankrupt in terms of funding its nuclear program, and reviving it takes time. Moreover, the war exposed weaknesses in Iran’s military. It exposed how Israeli or other Western spies have infiltrated Iran's national security ranks, and also that Iran's air defenses are nonexistent. Iran knows that anything they do right now means they're more vulnerable to attacks. As a result, they may currently be in a rethink phase.

If Iran decides to continue its nuclear program, is there any room for a diplomatic response from the US and its allies? Or will the US and Israel feel compelled to resort to other tools, such as new economic pressure or additional military strikes, to prevent Iranian proliferation?

This war has damaged the credibility of the US when it comes to good faith negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. This is not just how Iranian leaders understand it or what they're propagandizing about; when you're negotiating with someone and they attack you, the very reason for negotiation is undermined. It becomes difficult to have credibility for future talks. As a result, the bar for what would bring Iran to the table has considerably risen. Next time around, Iranians would want greater guarantees that they would not be attacked mid-talks.

At the same time, as some observers have noted, if Iran's nuclear facilities have been significantly damaged or its highly enriched uranium stockpiles have been affected, there isn’t much to negotiate. It goes back to the previous question of how much damage has been done. We just don't have a clear picture of that yet. In the next six to twelve months, as the Iranian government or its national security apparatus reasserts itself, perhaps we'll begin to see what kind of posture they're adopting.

With diplomacy, the door is always open for new arrangements, solutions, or processes to be put in place. Nonetheless, this would require a robust set of guarantees to ensure the credibility of any kind of negotiations.

Iran has long used proxies to extend its power as a key tool in its foreign policy. In the past few years, this influence has weakened significantly, especially with the fall of the Assad regime and with the decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah. What does the loss of influence through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime’s demise mean for Iran’s foreign policy and its broader influence in the near future?

It’s significant. What elevated Iran’s status as a regional power after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was its ability to fortify deep alliances with its network of militias and proxies, but also with partners like Bashar al-Assad. Iran had a forward defense strategy, which was to create buffer zones to confront its strategic enemies on foreign soil, rather than its home base, and that any negotiations would involve actions outside of Iran. This made the domestic costs low if not free.

This strategy has collapsed with the overthrow of Assad and the systematic dismantling of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other proxies in the region’s leadership. Thus, Iran has run out of bargaining chips in the regional picture and is very much in retreat, if not completely back to where it was prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

On top of that, domestically, the public is completely fed up and exhausted by how much the Iranian regime has spent on what ultimately turned out to be failing and failed projects, particularly the billions of dollars spent to fortify the Assad regime. The tens of billions of dollars spent on networks of proxies have all proven to be a foundation for cultivating corruption among the Revolutionary Guards inside the country; they established businesses and are now using this as a black market for their own interests. This strategy has really backfired domestically. Thus, they’re in a severely weakened position.

The new term “axis of upheaval" is being used to describe a Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean partnership, a group united in its opposition to the United States and the desire to upend a Western-led global order. However, the importance of this axis or informal alliance seems to be waning, given the lack of response from China, Russia, and North Korea after the June attacks. In your estimation, what is the significance of this partnership now?

It was likely always a partnership in name only. It didn't have serious material benefits, especially for the weaker partners in this relationship, Iran and North Korea. Russia is mired in its own big conflict. It's facing a very formidable foe, not just Ukraine but also the Western military industrial complex supporting it. This conflict is costing the Russians billions of dollars and a million casualties. As a result, they don’t have the resources to focus on Iran.

China really only needs Iran for cheap oil. They signed a strategic partnership agreement with Iran, where they barter for Iran's oil because Iran cannot sell it in international markets. Essentially, China gets Iran's oil at a massive discount, and the Chinese flood the Iranian economy with cheap electronics and consumer goods. This has been irritating the Iranian public because it's an asymmetrical deal where China receives precious oil and gas, while Iranians get cheap electronics and knock-off toys in the domestic economy.

China and Russia benefit from Iran serving as a thorn in the side of American interests in the region, but they ultimately are not investing in it as a strategic partner. The June attacks only proved further that the partnership is in name only.

Iran is currently facing acute water shortages and an energy crisis, not to mention rampant inflation. What effects will these challenges have on both the survival of the regime and the suffering of the Iranian people?

Domestic indicators point to a crisis for the regime. The water shortages are serious and real. The shortages are not just because of the misfortune of a country that isn’t getting enough rain. It is about the mismanagement of Iran's wells and its dam construction that have proven to be disastrous and thoughtlessly pursued. Scarce water resources are being funneled through corrupt networks that serve the well-off, as opposed to the masses. That pressure cooker at some point is going to boil over.

No one knows what the trigger will ultimately be in terms of how this manifests itself in politics. Nonetheless, you can see a lot of dead wood and kindling sitting around, and it's a question of what will light that match. We've seen it previously in the case of the Arab uprisings in 2010 and 2011, where it came from the least expected quarters. In Tunisia, it was a fruit seller whose dignity was trampled on by a local police officer that led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. We don’t know how it will happen in Iran.

Iran also faces an impending succession crisis. The Supreme Leader is old, and he appears to have taken a severe hit to his reputation after the June attack. He seems like a ghost more than a living presence right now on the Iranian political scene. His sudden death could serve as a catalyst.

No one knows exactly what the trigger will be, but these domestic crises will likely shape the direction of the country. If the government by some miracle manages to address these challenges, it may buy time, but officials have consistently failed to resolve problems of this level of complexity.

What opportunities and challenges do domestic groups opposing the Iranian regime face after the events of this summer?

There are more challenges than opportunities. For one, there's no clear alternative to this regime. No movement, figurehead, or political party resonates enough with the majority of the Iranian public. There are opposition groups, but each has its own bases of support and is hated by other groups. The absence of an alternative means that it's very difficult to coordinate a collective response.

Despite this lack of a clear political alternative, there is a general agreement among various political factions that when the moment comes to overthrow this regime, they will all cooperate. No one is going to side with the regime. Thus, there is an opportunity for coalition building by someone who is intrepid enough. This coalition will likely emerge organically. I don’t expect a single unifying leader to rise up because the regime is so effective at eliminating potential leaders.

There is an opportunity for a transformation from inside the regime itself. There are factions inside the government who believe the regime is at a dead end, and they're beginning to advance narratives reminiscent of the ones heard towards the end of the Soviet Union. Whether these figures can manage to expertly handle this at this particular time period is to be seen.