Hezbollah has declared “open war” on Israel following strikes on Iran, with missiles and airstrikes on both sides, and now, Israeli troops are deploying in Southern Lebanon. What are Hezbollah and Israel’s current strategies and goals in this escalation? What forms of retaliation are most likely going forward, and under what conditions could this expand into a broader regional war? 

From the perspective of Hezbollah, there has not been a real ceasefire with Israel for quite some time. Israel and Lebanon negotiated a ceasefire in November 2024 that required Hezbollah’s disarmament. They have yet to disarm and Israel has continued to selectively attack targets, sometimes multiple times per week. 

Hezbollah’s strategy at the moment is primarily, though not exclusively, about survival. For Hezbollah, the killing of the Supreme Leader was a red line. Parts of the organization’s leadership clearly felt compelled to respond. However, their initial action was relatively limited, consisting of a small-scale attack with drones and rockets. Had the US and Israel's attack on Iran been more limited, for instance, only striking nuclear sites, Hezbollah likely would not have responded, in part because they have been so weakened by the fighting of the past few years. They will now likely continue to put up some low level of resistance, while preserving their forces as best they can to last through the fighting. 

Israel has a very different strategy. Ever since the war in Gaza started in October 2023, they have had a ‘no threats’ policy. Essentially, they don't accept anything they deem a threat in their neighborhood. Hezbollah’s weapons are a threat to them, and they were determined to eliminate it if they had a chance. Hezbollah’s initial attack gave them an opportunity to finish up something that didn't get done in 2024. 

Israel’s offensive in 2024 against Hezbollah has significantly degraded the organization’s capabilities, infrastructure, and forces, including the loss of key figures like Hassan Nasrallah. To what extent has Hezbollah been able to rebuild its forces and influence? What are the main impediments? How are these losses limiting its ability to engage in and sustain its current conflict with Israel? 

Reports that Hezbollah was able to rebuild were greatly exaggerated. It had already been cut off from its major source of weapons after the Assad regime fell in Syria, making it much more difficult to rearm. They probably did manage to re-establish chains of command. Nonetheless, they are much weaker. Estimates indicate that they might only have about 1/5 of the weaponry that they had prior to 2023. It is impossible to know exactly what they have, but it is clear that they don't have the armaments that they had before. Hezbollah will therefore be a little bit more cautious in how they proceed. They are likely to hold a reserve of their force back to make sure that they have a fighting force going forward, as long as they are able to do so. 

In November of 2024, Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire agreement, yet throughout it, both sides have accused each other of violating the agreement. Now, it has collapsed. What key issues and disagreements made that agreement so fragile, and why did it fail to prevent renewed escalation? Could we see another one like it end this current conflict? 

The ceasefire agreement wasn't satisfactory to either side. Firstly, Hezbollah accepted the agreement, but they didn't actually sign the agreement themselves. The Lebanese state signed it, and it did not actually say that Hezbollah was going to disarm. Instead, it said that there would be no weapons south of the Litani River, and that provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which passed back in 2006, would be implemented. Those did mention the disarmament of militias, but Hezbollah contests that. So, the ceasefire was already vague in its language, and Hezbollah was going to do its absolute best to maintain its armaments. Israel knew that, and as a result, they didn't adhere to the language of the ceasefire either, and continued to strike targets regularly. Reports indicate that Israel is insisting, with American support, that the only way for a ceasefire to happen is for the Lebanese state to agree to forcibly disarm Hezbollah and declare the party illegal. The government does not seem likely to agree to that, so there’s not much chance of a ceasefire right now. 

Disarmament has been a recurring issue in Lebanon since the civil war, and the 2024 ceasefire agreement placed pressure on Hezbollah to dismantle its arms, particularly south of the Litani River. Given the renewed fighting and the Lebanese government’s ban on Hezbollah’s military activities, do you see any realistic pathway for Hezbollah to disarm? And if Hezbollah were to relinquish its arms, how would that reshape its authority and legitimacy, as well as that of the Lebanese Armed Forces? 

Hezbollah has made clear that they have no intention of disarming. They will be very resistant to that, and they have the means to resist it quite effectively. On the other hand, there is enormous pressure in Lebanon on Hezbollah to disarm. Not only did the government just pass a measure demanding that Hezbollah completely disarm, which is unprecedented, but Hezbollah's partner in the Shia community, Amal, also joined this measure. For decades, those two have been referred to as the Shia Duo because they coordinated closely. Hezbollah had more weapons and more capabilities than Amal did, but they worked side-by-side and often took similar positions. Moreover, Amal would not do that if there were not a lot of sympathy within the Shia community for that position. Thus, there is a lot of pressure on Hezbollah to disarm. It is just very difficult to get Hezbollah to agree to that, since it sees its arms as the heart of its identity. 

If the Lebanese government and Hezbollah were very creative, they could think of ways to possibly make some sort of compromise, such as by integrating parts of Hezbollah into the army. But it is unclear whether that would satisfy the Israelis or if Hezbollah would agree to it. So really, there do not seem to be any good ideas on how to resolve this situation, which means there is potential for the fighting to continue for quite some time. Even military force, however, may not be enough to force Hezbollah to disarm, short of a major ground campaign. And Israel’s history of intervention in Lebanon does not bode well for the success of a military campaign along those lines. Indeed, such a campaign would play into Hezbollah’s strength as an insurgent force. Nonetheless, that is what Israel seems to be preparing to do, while pressuring the Lebanese government and army to disarm the group and declare it illegal. 

How would you characterize Hezbollah’s place in Lebanon’s governance structure? Does it function as a parallel state, a political party with a militia, or something else entirely? How has this role shaped Lebanon’s political stability and the potential for reform? 

None of those terms is completely satisfactory. On the one hand, Hezbollah has some elements of a state. They have a sort of political authority, social institutions, and a military wing. On the other hand, they do not want to take on all the obligations of the state. They are perfectly content to recognize the authority of the Lebanese state in most areas, including the army, and to allow the Lebanese government to function because they simply are not able to rule over other communities. They have thrived off this ambiguous status that they have made. This makes reform in Lebanon difficult across a whole range of issues. Not only does Hezbollah have a political veto, but they also have a veto of arms as well. If there is a decision that they oppose, they can oppose it with force. That said, Hezbollah is not the only factor keeping the Lebanese from establishing a well-functioning state. 

6. Following the 2019 financial crisis and subsequent conflict with Israel, Lebanon’s economy continues to struggle. Which structural issues are most central to this crisis, and what policy reforms are necessary to address them? Do you see credible prospects for economic recovery? 

There are a great number of problems in Lebanon. The 2019 financial crisis broke out because of an issue in the country's financing and banking system, in which they had been operating the equivalent of a Ponzi scheme. They had been borrowing money from abroad to finance not only large debts, but also to keep their exchange rates stable. At the same time, they paid high interest rates to invite foreigners, including Lebanese abroad, people from around the Gulf, and others from around the world, to deposit their money in Lebanon. In retrospect, it's impossible to understand how the country’s financial elite kept the scam going. But at the time, like most scam artists, they were very convincing. 

When the system finally did come crashing down, they could no longer pay back the money deposited. Those obligations were in dollars, which the banks no longer have. As a result, it's taken a long time to determine how to move forward, because ultimately, somebody has to lose. So who gets their money back? Is it the big foreign depositors with influence in Lebanon? Is it the expat Lebanese community? Lebanese political leaders? Is it the normal Lebanese citizens or the middle class with their life savings in their bank accounts? 

This is a political issue as well as a financial one, and it was complicated by the COVID-19 crisis, a lack of accountability after the Beirut port blast a few years ago, and subsequent conflict with Israel. Only last year were they finally able to put together a new government headed by the former army commander, Joseph Aoun. He appointed a prime minister, Nawaf Salam, who is very intent on reform, but it's been difficult to address all these issues with international conflicts going on. An end to conflict would help Lebanon, but it's still going to have to get past a lot of other issues, including an inefficient government and an economy that doesn’t produce much.