Taiwan's 2024 election resulted in a divided government, with one party holding the presidency and the opposition controlling the legislature. Given that the 2025 recall efforts to alter that balance failed, what does this tell us about the electorate's current priorities?

Taiwan’s electorate is deeply divided at present. The last election was very much a split decision. I would interpret this primarily as a sign of dissatisfaction with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. In both 2016 and 2020, the DPP presidential candidate secured more than 56 percent of the vote. For that figure to fall to around 40 percent represents a clear backlash from the electorate. The DPP was fortunate to retain the presidency despite failing to win a majority.

The Kuomintang (KMT), however, cannot take much comfort from the 2024 results either. They had what might be described as a golden opportunity to unseat the DPP, yet they were unable to capitalize on it. Personally, I had expected more voters to vote strategically for Hou Yu-ih. Instead, over a quarter of the electorate supported the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate, Ko Wen-je, despite polling that consistently placed him in third.

This outcome highlights what I believe is the key interpretation: a growing share of Taiwan’s electorate is dissatisfied with both major parties. “Disillusioned” may not be the right word, but there is certainly a sense of frustration with the direction of Taiwan’s politics and with the inability of either major party to address pressing concerns. The TPP’s performance was surprisingly strong: not only in the presidential contest but also in the legislative elections. In either case, they achieved the best result any third party has ever had in the party-list vote. This should be understood as a significant segment of the electorate signaling its rejection of the two dominant parties and expressing hope for either a viable alternative or, at the very least, a greater responsiveness to issues long neglected by the political mainstream.

Did the recall wave shift public expectations about how legislators should act between elections, and what does that mean for Taiwan’s legislative credibility?

I am not certain that the recall wave fundamentally shifted public expectations, but it clearly influenced the behavior of some legislators who faced the possibility of a recall. I have observed this through their public statements and actions, and I have also heard privately that many first-term Kuomintang (KMT) legislators did not initially believe that recalls were feasible. Some may have assumed that the signature-gathering process was too burdensome, or that the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) together could raise the recall threshold if the threat became serious.

What struck me was how aggressive some legislators were in both their legislative proposals and political posturing during the first year of the Lai Ching-te administration. When 31 legislators were subjected to recall votes, it created genuine anxiety, particularly among KMT members. A few months before the recalls, KMT legislators in swing districts were especially nervous, anticipating possible losses. As a result, the party had to mobilize significant resources to defend its incumbents.

By contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) did not face any recalls, creating a clear asymmetry. While the KMT was expending time, energy, and resources to protect its legislators, the DPP was largely able to watch from the sidelines. Although the targeted legislators ultimately survived, the episode was nonetheless a sobering experience. It demonstrated that if legislators acted too aggressively or took positions that diverged sharply from public opinion, they risked facing recall. Even if they succeed in defeating the effort, doing so requires considerable time and financial investment. These are costs that are hardly trivial. My hope is that this episode will exert a moderating influence on the KMT caucus going forward.

In what ways do these contests intensify the DPP–KMT rivalry, and do you see this polarization benefiting Beijing or influencing its United Front work? 

Polarization between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) has been a defining feature of Taiwanese politics for decades. When I first began studying Taiwan during the Chen Shui-bian era, polarization was already entrenched. The 2004 presidential election is illustrative: after losing, KMT nominee Lien Chan refused to concede, and the result was an outpouring of emotionally charged rhetoric between the two parties. In short, DPP–KMT polarization is not new.

I also take a somewhat contrarian view on whether polarization is inherently negative. In fact, I would argue it contributes to the resilience of Taiwan’s democracy. Many Taiwanese follow politics very closely. Reports suggest there are seven or eight 24-hour news channels serving an island of just 23 million people. This is an extraordinary level of political engagement. This high degree of public attentiveness is, in many respects, a democratic strength.

Where polarization is more problematic is in its effect on cross-party consensus in the face of existential challenges, particularly the threat posed by Beijing. Yet even here, the differences are often overstated. Listening to both parties, especially during the campaign, the gap between them on security policy is narrower than it may appear. While they may debate allocations within the defense budget, for example, whether to prioritize submarines over other systems, there is broad agreement that Taiwan must increase defense spending. Indeed, in recent weeks the KMT publicly endorsed a special budget that would significantly expand defense expenditures. This suggests polarization does not fatally undermine Taiwan’s ability to confront the PRC threat.

In fact, I am more concerned about democracies where political systems are less attuned to the risks of PRC influence. Research on influence operations indicates they are most effective when they are covert, operating below the radar. Once exposed, particularly when such activities violate domestic law, simply prosecuting offenders can substantially blunt their impact.

Taiwan, by contrast, is acutely aware of Beijing’s influence efforts. I sometimes liken it to a patient who has grown up exposed to a disease and developed antibodies over time. Taiwanese democracy functions similarly: it has lived alongside PRC influence for decades and has built resilience against it. While Beijing’s influence clearly exists, its actual impact on voting behavior and political discourse is far less significant than many outside observers might assume.

The framing of the 2025 recalls – either as democratic vibrancy or as dysfunction – can influence U.S. support for Taiwan at a critical time. To what extent do you think media framing of the recalls shape public opinion and Congressional support for Taiwan?

In my view, the larger issue for Taiwan was not the recalls themselves but the opposition’s decision to cut the budget in December 2024. To provide some context, most members of the U.S. Congress do not follow the details of Taiwan’s domestic politics closely, nor should they, given the many other priorities they face. What captures their attention are matters directly tied to defense and security within the U.S.–Taiwan relationship.

From that perspective, the opposition’s move to freeze and reduce portions of the defense budget was a serious public relations misstep. To American observers, it appeared counterproductive and signaled that at least part of Taiwan’s political establishment was not taking U.S. security concerns seriously. In response, the Kuomintang (KMT), and I would argue, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) as well, has since been in damage-control mode. Both have tried to reassure U.S. officials that they do, in fact, support Taiwan’s defense, while framing their actions as concerns over wasteful spending or misallocation of resources rather than opposition to defense investment itself.

Still, for the average member of Congress, the perception is simpler: the KMT cut the defense budget, which reinforces a narrative that the party is aligned with Beijing or acting as its proxy. In my assessment, this episode had a far greater impact on U.S. perceptions of Taiwan than the recalls or their outcomes.

You suggested the recalls were less about local issues and more about national partisan competition. What does this tell us about how Taiwan’s democracy is evolving – are local mechanisms increasingly being swallowed up by national political dynamics?

This is a question I am currently exploring in a book project on Taiwan’s party system. While I still need to fully develop the supporting data, one of my central arguments is that Taiwan’s politics have become increasingly nationalized. Local factors now play a smaller role not only in national elections but also in contests such as mayoral races, where outcomes are increasingly shaped by partisan dynamics rather than candidate quality or idiosyncratic local concerns, whether in Yilan, Tainan, Pingtung, or other districts.

Institutional changes have reinforced this trend. Taiwan now holds all of its local elections on the same cycle, every four years, and national elections for the presidency and legislature are also synchronized. This alignment ensures that the electorate is essentially the same across all levels: from city mayor and council down to township and village elections.

As a result, the influence of local factions, which once played a dominant role in Taiwanese politics and were the focus of considerable scholarship 15 to 20 years ago, appears to be declining. Factions thrived in low-turnout elections, where they could consolidate power by mobilizing their networks to control key offices. But with higher turnout generated by synchronized elections, their ability to dominate local outcomes has diminished.

Over time, Taiwan’s party system has become more nationalized, with elections increasingly revolving around national-level issues rather than appeals rooted in local identity; for example, a candidate winning simply because they are a “son of Yilan.” That said, I do not wish to overstate the point. Local issues still matter, but relative to thirty years ago, national partisan dynamics now play a much larger role in shaping Taiwan’s electoral politics.

In your blog, you emphasized the ‘dangers of weaponizing recalls.’ Do you think Taiwan’s institutions will adapt – for example, by reforming recall thresholds – or are recalls likely to remain a recurring feature of partisan struggle?

One of the biggest surprises of the recent recall elections was that none of them succeeded. Despite the significant costs of organizing, gathering signatures, placing measures on the ballot, and campaigning, the recalls produced no changes in officeholders.

Before this summer, the prevailing narrative in Taiwan was that recalls were an effective political weapon. If an elected official appeared unpopular, a recall seemed like a viable way to remove them. This perception dates back at least to the 2020 recall of Han Kuo-yu, and until this year, roughly half of the recall attempts had succeeded. That track record created real enthusiasm for using recalls as a tool to punish officials perceived to be out of step with their constituents.

The comprehensive failure of the 2025 recalls has shifted that narrative. Going forward, there will likely be less appetite for deploying this mechanism. Ideally, recalls will return to their original purpose: a safeguard to hold officials accountable for genuine misconduct, whether unethical or otherwise inappropriate for their office, rather than serving as a partisan weapon against temporary unpopularity.

During the campaigns, however, an alternative narrative emerged. It framed recalls as a kind of safety valve in Taiwan’s divided government system. Because Taiwan is not a parliamentary regime, the legislature cannot simply be dissolved and new elections called. For some, recalls were seen as the next best thing. Yet the failure of these efforts has shown that, in practice, recalls are not a realistic substitute for parliamentary dissolution.

As a result, all three major parties now face the reality that they are effectively bound together for the next two and a half years. The optimistic view is that this recognition will encourage greater cooperation across party lines, fostering more constructive governance in the period ahead.